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I. OVERVIEW OF SPYWARE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW
Identity theft is lucrative; stealing one's good name is lucrative. What
liability deters the people who steal digital information, even if it might be
considered worthless? The Federal Trade Commission logged up to
250,000 identity theft complaints in 2004-100,000 more than in 2002. By
and large, the law has been silent; and companies, some legitimate and
some not, continue to collect, store, and process consumer information. The
law provides those whose private information is being misused little
recourse and provides little protection for those legitimately mining
information. Even though large-scale breaches grab the headlines, many
victims of identity theft frequently cause the offending disclosure by
unwittingly downloading software from the World Wide Web ("Web") or
responding to email "phishing" and other online and offline scams.
Although courts find a right to privacy in the United States Constitution,
that right generally only protects citizens from invasions by the
government, not by corporate America.
Today, federal law enables spyware, adware, and phishing businesses
to mine consumer data with impunity. This Article demonstrates that
although some laws are ineffective, others provide consumers with some
minimal relief. In addition, the Article proposes an innovative solution. It
also discusses the implications of the "evil-ution" of software developers in
the context of the law, analyzing the evolution of the software developer,
the impact of the rapidly increasing skill of the developers, and the
disastrous outcomes that may occur if governments fail to act.

II. SPYWARE TECHNOLOGY: A TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
Understanding spyware requires the realization that any connection to
a site on the Web is not passive, and the visitor does not wander around
invisibly. Connecting to the Web is not like opening a book in the library
and looking at its contents. While the person accessing the Web is
gathering information from the site; the site knows the visitor is there,
monitors the visitor's actions, and has varying levels of access-by the
visitor's invitation-to that visitor's computer. One of the earliest forms of
this active interaction was cookie technology.' Most users find cookies
beneficial because they eliminate the need to repeatedly fill out order forms
or re-register on Web sites. 2 For instance, with passwords being

1. See Sarah Gordon, FightingSpyware and Adware in the Enterprise,INFO. SYS. SEC.
14, 14 (July/Aug. 2005) (referring to spyware evolving from simple cookie technology).
2. Inna Fayenson, 'Cookies' Challenge Meaning of Privacy,NEW YORK L.J., Nov. 13,
2001, at S-10.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 59

increasingly difficult to remember, some sites that require user names and
passwords place cookies on the3 hard drive so the user has the option to log
in automatically when visiting.
The reality is, however, that many businesses seek more competitive
advantages. Consequently, they have developed a variety of legitimate and5
4
illegitimate technologies to enhance their market advantage. Data miners
that actively collect information, dialers that change the computer's dial-up
networking, worms that create self-replicating viruses, and hijackers that
hijack a user's
home page are all examples of modifications of cookie
8
technology.

A. Spyware Defined
Spyware is generally defined as software that, once installed on a
person's computer (usually without consent), collects and reports in-depth
information about that end-user. 9 Spyware is the progeny of clickstream
data or cookie-based data mining technology. t These technologies are
viewed as instrumental to the operation of the global information society.
To demonstrate this expansive reliance on cookie technologies, the reader
need only view the cookies stored on any personal computer."1 The
intertwined nature of spyware to other data mining technologies makes
3. See Rik Farrow, Is Your Desktop Being Wiretapped?,NETWORK MAG., Aug. 2003,
at 52 (discussing keystroke logging so that "[a]n end user might use this record to create a
macro so that a particular operation can be repeated.").
4. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000) (legislative
response to combat illegitimate technologies).
5. See, e.g., Ronald Urbach & Gary Kibel, Adware/Spyware: An Update Regarding
PendingLitigation and Legislation, 16 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12, 12-16 (2004).
6. See Mark D. Collier, Current Threats to and Technical Solutionsfor Voice Security,
Aerospace Conference Proceedings, 2002. 6 IEEE 6-2685, 6-2686 to 6-2690; Dennis
Estacion, Potential Security Problem looms for users of PC-based VoIP products, IEEE
CANADIAN REv. 19, 19-20 (Winter 2005).
7. See Michael Pastore, Inside Spyware: A Guide to Finding, Removing and
Preventing Online Pests, INTRANET JOURNAL (2006), http://www.intranetjournal.com/
spyware (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
8. See Lavasoft, Spyware from A to Z, http://www.lavasoftusa.com/support/
spywareeducationcenter/spyware.glossary.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
9. See id.
10. See generally Michael Gowan, How It Works: Cookies, PCWORLD, Feb. 22, 2000,
availableat http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 15352/article.html#.
11. Janine H. McNulty, Who Is Watching Your Keystrokes?, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 67, 7981. An end-user can view all of the cookies stored on a local machine using Internet
Explorer by following these steps: (1) open Internet Explorer; (2) select "Internet Options"
under the "Tools" menu; (3) click on the "General" tab and click the "Settings" button; (4)
click the "View Files" button; (5) sort files by type by clicking on "Type"; (6) find
documents of the type labeled "Text Document." To see the information stored by the
cookie in its raw and likely unintelligible format, double-click on one of these text files
containing "cookie" in its file name.
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regulation a very delicate and difficult process. Most Web Portals would be
severely limited, if not rendered useless, in the absence of spyware-like
technologies. Web sites that would not operate if such technology was
prohibited are: www.yahoo.com; www.wamu.com; www.schwab.com;
www.ibm.com. Adjoining these Web sites are a slew of intranet and Web
13
applications that utilize cookies and clickstream data for authentication.
Spyware is capable of gathering a wide range of information,
including Web-surfing habits, each and every keystroke, email messages,
credit card information, and other personal information on users'
computers.' 4 In the world of technology, "spyware" is the umbrella term
under which numerous technologies, both legal and malicious, fall. These
include: adware, 15 trojans, 16 hijackers, 17 key loggers, 18 dialers, and
malware. 19 While each of these technologies has its own unique behavior,
for the most part they are all installed without a user's informed and
explicit consent and tend to extract varying
,20 degrees of personal
information, usually without that end-user's consent. For instance, trojan
spyware operates with a focus on stealing passwords by using a
12. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau News,
(Mar. 2, 2000), availableat http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/re
tail industries/000523.html.
13. See Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P. Harris, Voice Over
Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?, 29SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 97, 108-09 (2005).
14. Cade Metz, Spy Stoppers, PC MAG., Mar. 2, 2004, at 79, 80.
15. Spyware differs from adware technology because the primary purpose of adware is
to display advertisements on Web pages or in programs such that those advertisements
generate income for the software owners. See Spyware from A to Z, supra note 8; See also
James R. Hagerty & Dennis K. Berman, New BattlegroundIn Web Privacy War: Ads That
Snoop, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2003, at Al.
16. See Microsoft Help and Support, Descriptionof the Win32.DIDer Trojan Program,
http://support.microsoft.com/?scid=kb;EN-US;Q317013 (last visited Nov. 3, 2006) (stating
that "Trojan programs are programs that pretend to do one thing while secretly doing
something else.").
17. See How TopText Works, SCUMWARE.COM, http://scumware.com/wm2.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2006) (equating Internet traffic hijacking with spyware) [hereinafter
Scumware].
18. See Kishore Subramanyam, Charles E. Frank & Donald H. Galli, Keyloggers: The
Overlooked Threat to Computer Security at First Midstates Conference for Undergraduate
Research in Computer Science and Mathematics, Oct. 2003, available at
http://www.denison.edu/mathcs/mcurcsm2003/papers/keyloggers.pdf; Pete Cafarchio, The
Challenge ofNon- Viral Malware, PESTPATROL, http://www.pestpatrol.com/whitepapers/non
viralmalware09O2.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). See generally Dr. E. Eugene Schultz,
Pandora'sBox: Spyware, Adware, Autoexecution, and NGSCB, 22 COMPUTERS & SECURITY
366 (July 2003).
19. See Cafarchio, supra note 18.
20. See generally Janice C. Sipior et al., The Ethical and Legal Concerns of Spyware,
22 J. INFO. SYS. MGMT. 39 (Spring 2005) (discussing the controversy surrounding various
forms of spyware).
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"trojanized" piece of software to grab passwords. This occurs either
directly from the keyboard or while in transit over the network. Trojan
spyware has been implemented many times
on a raft of different platforms
21
and is installed without the user's consent.
Spyware operates in relative secrecy, gathering end-user information
without the end-user's consent or knowledge. When spyware successfully
installs, it is difficult to remove because it embeds itself within the system
and uses various techniques to detect and replace various files that are
integral to the operation of the user's machine. Consequently, if a user rips
out one or two parts, the undetected parts will come in and replace the files
that were removed.2 2 The outcome is that although the user is aware that
spyware is installed, it is difficult for the user to remove, even when
utilizing spyware removal technology. 23 Spyware blurs the existing fuzzy
line between a malicious virus and an aggressive Internet marketing tool.
Spyware, however, can monitor more than just the Web pages an Internet
25
surfer visits;2 4 it can also access the end-user's electronic file system,
email system, Web pages viewed, and
any other unencrypted information
26
the end-user accesses on the machine.
While valid commercial uses for spyware exist, its primary purpose is
to spy and to gather information by invading a user's protected digital
space, unbeknownst to the end-user, 2 7 and to relay it to a third party. For
instance, a malicious spyware application might "pop up" a dialog box that
warns the user of a problem with his or her account only to redirect that
person to a look-alike site, which then acquires personal financial resources
of
the user. 2 8 Generally, malicious spyware tends to2 9 be financially
motivated,
distinguishing itself from past viruses/malware.
B. Spyware Has Two PrimaryForms
Once installed on an end-user's machine, spyware can be catalogued
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Cafarchio, supra note 18.
See Schultz, supra note 18, at 366-67.
See Schultz, supra note 18, at 366-67.
See Urbach & Kibel, supranote 5, at 12-14.
See Schultz, supra note 18, at 366-67.
Christopher J. Volkmer, Should Adware and Spyware Prompt Congressional

Action?, 7 J. OF INTERNET L. 1, 12-13 (May 2004).

27. See Ed Foster, The Spy Who Loves You: Some 'Free' Internet Services Come with
the

Kind of Surveillance

You

May

Not

Want,

INFOWORLD,

http://www.infoworld.comarticle/02/05/17/O20520opgripe_l.html
downloading spyware agents unknowingly).

May

17,

2002,

(referring

to

users

28. See Jason Krause, Prying Eyes: Self-Installing 'Spyware' Poses a Growing Threat
to PCs, 91 A.B.A. J. 60, 60 (May 2005).

29. See Chris King, The Business ofSpyware, ITDEFENSE, http://www.itdefensemag.
com/5_06/articles2.php (last visted Nov. 3, 2006).
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in one of two ways: (1) software-enabled installation of spyware via
shareware applications; and (2) Web-enabled installation through a user's
browser. This distinction is drawn because spyware's delivery and
installation mechanisms3 1 can be categorized as either software-enabled or
Web-enabled spyware.
1. Software-Enabled Installation of Spyware via Shareware
According to researchers from the University of Washington's
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, software-enabled
spyware installs itself by attaching to shareware software, such as Kazaa
(http://www.kazaa.com/), which "has been the source of hundreds of
millions of spyware installations." 32 Commonly, these software programs
are embedded within a Dynamic Link Library ("DLL") that the intruder
can manipulate at a later date. On average, infected computers have 93
spyware components, 33 making the process of removal-even for a
knowledgeable technical person--an arduous and daunting, if not
impossible, task. Software-enabled spyware that relies on this attachment
34
mechanism for installation has been coined "piggy-backed spyware."
The majority of software-enabled spyware programs fall within the
"piggy-backed spyware" installation method.3 5 After installation, the
spyware remains hidden from the user, and because the user consented to
its installation via the shareware application End-user License Agreement
("EULA"), it does not violate black-letter law when transmitting data to
third parties. For instance, to ensnare a victim, commercial trojan spyware
36
has
been to
distributed
in romantic,parties
joke,isand
other address
e-cards.of
Alltarget.
that 37
is
necessary
spy on unsuspecting
the email
the

30. See generally Kevin Townsend, Spyware, Adware, and Peer-to-PeerNetworks: The
Hidden Threat to Corporate Security (PestPatrol, Inc., Technical White Paper, Apr. 2,
2003), available at http://www.pestpatrol.com/files/PDF/Whitepapers/SpywareAdware
P2P.pdf.
31. Alexander Moshchuk et al., A Crawler-basedStudy ofSpyware on the Web, at 1 (U.
of Wash. Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering), http://www.cs.washington.edu/
homes/gribble/papers/spycrawler.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., id.
35. Id.
36. Email PI has deployed this variation on the e-card approach that is "an unashamed
example of commercial trojan spyware. . . [with] a selection of five different E-cardsromantic, joke and others, with which to ensnare your victim." Pete Simpson, New Blends
ofEmail Threats, 24 CREDIT CONTROL 9, 12 (2003). See also Alan Blakley et al., Coddling
Spies: Why the Law Doesn't Adequately Address Computer Spyware, 2005 DuKE L. &
TECH. REv. No. 25, para. 29, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2005DLT
R0025.pdf.
37. For example, users shared a program, Web Surfer Tool Bar, via email distribution,
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Such spyware can remotely monitor every action taken on the end-user's
machine, can be logged remotely, and has notable potential in industrial
espionage as well as potential judicial repercussions. 3 8 This illustration
demonstrates the potential of spyware to impact both commercial business
and private citizens, irrespective of their locality. The reality is that
spyware could be mining data 39 on the end-user's machine, monitoring
instant messaging ("IM"), or monitoring voice conversations that utilize
Voice over Internet Protocol telephony ("VolP").4 °

2. Web-Enabled Installation of Spyware via Browser Vulnerability
The second type of spyware technology exploits vulnerabilities in
Web browsers or Web-based applications to install themselves on endusers' machines. 4 1 Functionally, the capabilities of the spyware installed
are analogous to those installed via shareware.
One main difference between the two types of spyware is that several
studies suggest that Web-enabled spyware is declining. 4 2 It is difficult to
determine the exact cause of the decline of this form of spyware, but it is
likely due to several factors: (1) public awareness; (2) adoption of anti43
spyware tools; and (3) adoption of automated patch installation tools.
These three elements have essentially helped prevent this type of spyware
from capitalizing on technology-based loopholes.

C. Adware Differsfrom Spyware
Spyware must be distinguished from adware. Adware is a modified
derivative of cookie technology and places either random or targeted
which embedded in the HTML-formatted email a hidden link to a site that dropped an
executable file into the C drive, and then exploited a known vulnerability in Internet
Explorer to automatically execute a Java Script. Once installed, this application inserted
multiple files on user systems and refreshed the system's registry keys, start-up page, and IE
references every couple of seconds. The skill required by the end-user to remove this
application extended beyond the average user's skill set. Furthermore, the application
embedded many references to pornography and gambling sites, rendering the user's browser
virtually nonfunctional. While Web Surfer Tool Bar was a form of adware, it could have
just as easily been used to deliver a malicious spyware application that stole and/or mined a
user's machine.
38. Simpson, supra note 36, at 12-13.
39. Cybersecurity and Consumer Data: What's at Risk for the Consumer?: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 58-59 (2003) (statement of Roger Thompson, Vice
President of Product Development, PestPatrol), available at http://energycommerce.
house.gov/108/action/108-52.pdf.
40. See Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 122.
41. Schultz, supra note 18, at 367.
42. See, e.g., Moshchuk, supra note 31, at 2.
43. See Moshchuk, supra note 31, at 13.
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advertisements on the screen of the user.44 Adware is generally not
malicious because it does not collect and use personal information for
illegitimate purposes. 4 5 Spyware, while similar to adware, is usually an
application installed on the user's computer and, by definition, is usually
installed without the user's knowledge. 46 Not only can spyware monitor
users' activities on the Web, but it can also monitor everything users do
with their machines and transmit that information to an outside entity.
Unfortunately, users mostly accept spyware unintentionally or without a
full and informed understanding of its parameters when downloading
something from the Web.
III. LEGAL TREATMENT OF SPYWARE
Spyware victims 47 pursuing civil remedies can currently pursue five
theories of recovery: (1) trespass to chattels; 48 (2) the Stored Wire and
Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Act ("Stored
Communications Act"); 49 (3) the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
("CFAA");5 0 (4) invasion of privacy; 5 1 and (5) the Wiretap Act. 52 Each of
these theories of recovery has varying levels of success depending on the
facts of the litigation, amount of damages, data mining methods, and the
nature of consent inferred from the plaintiff's conduct. A complaint should
allege any and all of these causes of action applicable, since the inner
workings of the specific spyware program may not be known until after
discovery.
First, spyware victims can assert a cause of action under the common
law tort theory of trespass to chattels.5 3 By inserting a code into another
person's computer system, the spyware perpetrator enters an end-user's
computer by intermeddling with it:
44. Webopedia, The Difference Between Adware & Spyware, http://www.webopedia.
com/DidYouKnow/intemet/2004/spyware.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
45. See id.
46. Hagerty, supranote 15, at Al.
47. Spyware affects not only individual users who wish to keep their personal
information, such as credit card information, social security numbers, etc., private, but also
businesses who wish not to have their secret processes, customer lists, financial information,
etc., disclosed to competitors or others. All of these "persons" have a significant interest in
the enforcement of controls on spyware perpetrators.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber

Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (Supp. III 2003). Other
commentators have referred to this statute by other names.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (Supp. III 2003).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. III 2003).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

218.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 59

One who commits a trespass to chattel is subject to liability to the
possessor of the chattel if, but only if,. .. (b) the chattel is impaired as
to itsobssessor
condition, quality, or value, or (c) the
is deprived of the
use of the chattel for a substantial time ...
Trespass to chattels claims arise under state common law, and therefore,
their usefulness depends on whether a particular jurisdiction is willing to
classify spyware violations as trespasses, as well as the requirements that
individual jurisdictions may have for proving trespass to chattels. Trespass
to chattels claims can also be hindered if a court finds that an end-user
granted consent. As such, trespass to chattels claims present a strong cause
of action against certain types of spyware in certain jurisdictions, and they
should be asserted if applicable.
Second, spyware victims can assert claims under the CFAA if the
aggregate damages over the course of a year exceed $5,0005 or the
spyware causes physical injury to any person. 56 The CFAA contains eight
powerful civil and criminal causes of action designed to prevent
unauthorized access to "protected computers" of U.S. government
agencies, financial institutions, and private end-users. 57 As long as an enduser's computer is used in interstate commerce, it constitutes a "protected
computer" and the end-user can bring an action for spyware violations
under this Act.5 8 Litigants alleging claims under the CFAA face two
potential drawbacks: (1) end-users frequently authorize spyware data
mining when they install the associated programs on their computers; and
(2) spyware is unlikely to cause over $5,000 worth of damages unless a
company has been victimized or multiple victims aggregate their
damages. Companies victimized by spyware will usually be able to meet
the $5,000 damage requirement assuming they either have in-house staff or
they hire a technology consultant to perform general system maintenance to
eliminate the spyware and plug any holes it has created. The CFAA
54. Id.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
56. The CFAA makes it an offense to "knowingly cause[] the transmission of a
program, information, code, or command" to intentionally cause damage to a protected
computer. See id. at § 1030(a)(5)(A) (Supp. III 2003). See also United States v. Middleton,
35 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190-92 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The fact that the CFAA does not have a
mens rea requirement for the damages element does not render the statute unconstitutional.
See United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 867-69 (9th Cir. 1996).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(2).
58. The interstate commerce requirement can be met by demonstrating the end-user
interacts via the Internet in some fashion with the respective spyware application.
59. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 520-23
(S.D. N.Y. 2001).
60. See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-51 (E.D.

Va. 1998) (holding that Internet site operator's use of Internet service provider membership
in order to harvest email addresses of provider's customers and send bulk emails to those
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provides the strongest cause of action available for businesses but does not
afford the vast majority of end-users
sufficient protection due to its high
61
$5,000 jurisdictional requirement.
Third, spyware victims may be able to assert causes of action under
the Stored Communications Act which protects end-user digital privacy, be
it email, IM, file transfer protocol, or other Internet-based communications
when the information is stored on the end-user's machine. 62 A spyware
victim alleging a violation of the Stored Communications Act must prove
that the spyware program (1) intentionally, (2) in an unauthorized fashion,
(3) gained access to a facility providing electronic communications, (4)
obtained electronic or wire communications, and (5) the data acquired by
the spyware program was in electronic storage. 63 Spyware programs mine
data that resides electronically on end-users' machines. 64 Spyware violates
the Stored Communications Act if it mines information in temporary
storage intended to be an electronic communication without consent. 5 Two

customers-in violation of provider's terms of service-violated CFAA, which prohibits
individuals from exceeding authorized access).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), (a)(5)(B)(i).
62. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2711, the statutory definitions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 of
the Federal Wiretap Act also apply to the Stored Communications Act. See United States v.
Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 575-76 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995), review grantedin part,44 M.J.
41 (C.A.A.F. 1996), rev'd in part,45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding that the defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in email messages stored in an online service
provider, America Online, and that this reasonable objective expectation of privacy, coupled
with a subjective expectation of privacy, justified protection. The court distinguished
between messages that were downloaded by another subscriber and messages retained in the
system's computer when deciding whether the expectation for privacy was reasonable, and
therefore, protected).
63. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2003)
(holding the SCA applies to information in temporary or backup storage).
64. Stefanos Gritzalis, Enhancing Web privacy and anonymity in the digital era, 12
INFO. MGMT. & COMPUTER SECURITY 255,265 (2004).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 201, 203 (Ist Cir. 2004),
reh 'g granted, 385 F.3d 793 (holding that the defendants' copying of emails at the server
level failed to constitute an interception and found the interception to be contemporaneous
with transmission); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-49 (11 th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 1051 (2003) (holding that "a contemporaneous interception-i.e., an
acquisition during 'flight'-is required to implicate the Wiretap Act with respect to
electronic communications."); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that "for a website such as Konop's to be 'intercepted' in violation of the
Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage.");
Steve Jackson Games Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that seizure of stored but unread email messages was not an interception), aff'g 816
F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (requiring interception to be contemporaneous with
transmission). But see, Konop, 302 F.3d at 886. (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (dissenting "from Part B of Section I, which holds that the term 'intercept' in the
Wiretap Act, as applied to electronic communications, refers solely to contemporaneous
acquisition.").
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drawbacks to the Stored Communications Act are that (1) personal data is
not protected unless it is an electronic communication, and (2) spyware can
mine any data on an end-user's machine as long as the end-user gives
consent to mine data when the spyware is installed along with another
freeware or shareware program. As a result, the Stored Communications
Act gives spyware victims a rather limited cause of action when a stored
electronic communication is mined without consent.
Fourth, spyware victims may have a cause of action under the tort of
invasion of privacy, or as Restatement (Second) of Torts calls it, "intrusion
upon seclusion."6 " The victim will claim that the spyware perpetrator, by
inserting the spyware without the victim's permission, "intrudes... upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns," and
there will be liability "if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person." 6The authors of the restatement specifically envision
intrusions that are not physical. The restatement specifies that the intrusion
"may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his
private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his
safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account .... ,68 The only
concern may be to show that "the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of
decency '69, leading to liability on the part of the perpetrator. Spyware
victims, therefore, will be more likely to recover under an invasion of
privacy theory if the spyware steals personally identifiable information,
such as private bank accounts, credit card numbers, and social security
numbers.
Fifth, spyware victims may be able to assert a cause of action under
the Federal Wiretap Act if the spyware intercepts an oral, wire, or
electronic communication without consent.7 1 Even though spyware's
primary functional purpose is to make unauthorized interceptions of
electronic communications, spyware developers have designed spyware
programs capable of evading the Wiretap Act's reach. 72 Spyware makers
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
67. Id.(emphasis added).
68. Id. at cmt. b.
69. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. j (1965) concerning the need to show that the limits of
decency have been exceeded).

70. Id.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000) (defining wire communication); 18 U.S.C. §
2510(2), (12) (2000) (defining oral communication and electronic communication).
72. See, e.g., U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D.

Va. 2003). U-Haul sued WhenU.com, Inc. because its pop-up advertisements interfered with
computer users' view of the company's Web sites. The court granted WhenU's motion for
summary judgment, concluding "that WhenU's pop-up advertising does not constitute
trademark or copyright infringement or unfair competition." WhenU has been sued by 1-800
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have accomplished this evasion by engineering their software to record
stored end-user files and end-user inputs before they are transmitted to
another communicant. 73 In certain situations, however, spyware victims
could successfully argue that while the spyware is merely tracking
communications input by the end-user onto his or her own computer, the
time between the end-user's input and the actual transmission of the bits of
data to the other communicant is so short, on the order of milliseconds, that
the communication begins contemporaneously with the end-user's input.
The courts have not yet credited this argument. However, if they did, then a
majority of spyware programs installed without actual consent could be
found to violate the Wiretap Act, and consumers could have another cause
of action against spyware proliferators.
In all five causes of action damages, can run the gamut from the
minor annoyance of uninstalling or otherwise removing the spyware, to
disposal of a computer that seems to have acquired a disease similar to
syphilis-eating its brain away-to thousands of dollars of damage caused
by the harvesting and exploitation of an end-user's personal information or
identity. Since most consumers are unlikely to have damages in amounts
sufficient to justify litigation, the class action device may be most useful,
especially under the CFAA, which offers powerful civil causes of action as
long as the victims can allege $5,00074 in damages. 75 Since the spyware
perpetrator's actions are the only actions relevant, and the cause of injuries
arise from the single course of conduct under the control of the spyware
perpetrator, courts may be more willing to certify these class actions.76
Companies, however, will easily be able to meet the damages requirement
given the loss in time, computing, people, and business resulting from
malicious spyware operating on their systems. 77 However, proving
Contacts, Quicken Loans, U-Haul, and Wells Fargo, among others. WhenU prevailed on
another motion for a preliminary injunction in Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293
F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
73. See Pastore, supra note 7 (referring to spyware as recording URL sites visited and
keystrokes).
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III).
75. The most creative plaintiff's attorney may attempt to use the civil remedy portion of
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000).
While civil RICO actions are disfavored and would require a great deal of specialized proof,
see, e.g., Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2004), the interested
plaintiff's attorney may find a way to attack the spyware boon and acquire treble damages.
76. See, e.g., Watson v. Shell Oil Company, 979 F.2d 1014, 1022 (5th Cir. 1992)
(certifying class for tort claims arising from oil refinery explosion).
77. Corporate America, however, utilizes spyware technology to spy on their
employees. See Andrew Schulman, The Extent of Systematic Monitoring of Employee Email andInternet Use, PRIVACY FouND., July 9, 2001, http://www.sonic.net/-undoc/extent.h
tin. Thus, companies using spyware in this context may be able to address malicious

spyware in a most cost effective manner. See Annotation, Recovery of Expected ProfitsLost
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damages if someone has not hired an outsider to fix the system could cost
more in expert testimony than the potential recovery.
A. Spyware Trespass to Chattels Actions
Spyware takes information from a computer without a person's
permission and generally without a person's knowledge. Typically, when
one thinks about trespass to chattels, the actual physical taking of a
personal possession has occurred. 78 However, nothing in the definition of
trespass to chattels 79 requires that the perpetrator actually possess the
chattel. Merely interfering with it, impairing its condition, or depriving
the rightfl owner of its use for a substantial time, 8 1 will suffice to create
liability. When spyware infects a computer, by definition the computer's
condition or value is impaired.82 The user cannot use it for its intended
purposes; its value as a repository of private information is clearly
impaired. Furthermore, when the spyware hijacks the computerredirecting any Internet search or homepage to a site the user does not
desire and until the user can remove the spyware-the
user is deprived of
83
the desired use of the chattel for a period of time.
Some litigation has already attempted to use trespass to chattels to
impose liability on spyware or spyware-like applications. The results are
inconsistent and particularly difficult due to the problems of quantifying
and proving the damages. What monetary damage, for example, does an
individual suffer when he or she must continually redirect a hijacked Web
browser while surfing the Internet in pursuit of a hobby? How can the
consumer quantify that damage? But, first, which courts have used trespass
to chattels in this context at all?
The Second Circuit had occasion to analyze whether the use of a
robot (an automated software program) to search another's database was a
trespass to chattels. 84 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers ("ICANN") authorized Register.com ("Register") to register
85
domain names for those wishing to establish Web sites on the Internet.
by Lessor's Breach ofLease Preventing or Delaying Operation of New Business, 92 A.L.R.

3d 1286, 1288-89 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 557 n.7 (4th Cir. 2005).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218.

80. Id. at (b).
81. Id. at(c).
82. Id. at (b).
83. Id. at (c).
84. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. (RegisterI1), 356 F.3d 393, 396-97 (2nd Cir.
2004) (describing the operation of Verio's software program).
85. Id. at 395 (describing Register's appointment by ICANN to serve as registrar of
domain names).
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Another company, Verio, designed "WHOIS", a software program that it
used as a robot to search contact information available over the Internet to
find entities that had newly registered domain names.86 Verio then
contacted the people who had registered the new Web sites to solicit them
87
to use Verio's Web site design development and operation services.
Verio's activities created confusion as to whether it was Register or Verio
contacting the new registrants. 88 Register brought a lawsuit in the federal
court for the Southern District of New York against Verio under a variety
of theories including trespass to chattels, seeking a preliminary
injunction.80
To prevent Verio from confusing consumers by searching Register's
database and soliciting Register's clients, the trial court issued an
injunction barring Verio from using Register's trademarks, accessing
Register's computers, or using data obtained from Register's database. 90 In
the portion of the opinion relevant to trespass to chattels, the Second
Circuit held this a viable cause of action under the circumstances, 9 1 in spite
92
of Verio's two-prong argument for reversal of the trial court's opinion.
First, Verio argued that its robot's invasion of Register's servers caused no
harm to Register. 93 Relying upon the trial court's findings of fact, the
Second Circuit found that the trial court was not unreasonable in finding
that:
[w]hile Verio's robots alone would not incapacitate Register's systems
. . if Verio were permitted to continue to access Register's computers
through such robots, it was 'highly probable' that other Internet service
providers would devise similar programs to access Rgister's data, and
that the system would be overtaxed and would crash.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit adopted the lower court's finding that
"a
Verio's search robots, while performing their work, were consuming
95
systems."
computer
Register's
of
capacity
the
of
portion
significant

86. Id. at 396.
87. Id.(describing means of solicitation).
88. Id.at 397 (describing Verio's sollicitations).
89. Register claimed that Verio caused confusion among customers, accessed Register's
computers without authorization, violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and
trespassed on Register's chattels. Id.at 397.
90. See Register II, 356 F.3d at 395.
91. Id.at 404-05.
92. Id.at 404 (stating the injunction premised on Register's claim of trespass to chattels
was within the range of the District Court's discretion).
93. Id. at 404-05 (outlining Verio's contentions).
94. Id. at 404.
95. RegisterI1,356 F.3d at 404.
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Verio next argued that Register impliedly gave Verio permission to
access the WHOIS database through Register. Somehow the court held
that Register's filing a complaint in court gave sufficient notice to Verio
that "its use of robots was not authorized and, according to Register's
contentions, would cause harm to Register's systems." 9 7 Consequently, the
court reasoned that Register revoked any potential implicit authorization it
had given to Verio by filing the litigation. This portion of the Second
Circuit's opinion is troubling because it seems to gloss over the question of
consent. However, in the appended opinion of Judge Fred I. Parker, the
reasoning concerning consent is more complete. 98 Judge Parker wished to
affirm the trial court's preliminary injunction on the trespass to chattels
claim to prohibit Verio from accessing Register's computer systems using
the software robot for multiple automatic excessive99 searches, but he
thought that the terms of the injunction were too broad.
Judge Parker gave a more satisfying analysis of the trespass to
chattels cause of action, finding it a reasonable use in this context and
finding that the digital world has "breathed new life into the common law
cause of action for trespass to chattels by finding it viable online... "100
Judge Parker applied the four elements of the tort to the facts. First, Verio
intended to use its robot to make successive inquiries. 0 1 Second, the robot
used Register's computer system, consuming some of its capacity. 102 Third,
the system had a finite capacity. 10 3 Finally, considering consent, Judge
Parker stated that "since at least the initiation of this lawsuit, Verio was not
authorized to use its search robot to access Register.com's computer
systems... ",104 yet it continued to do so.
Register had argued that the terms of its agreement to allow access to
its database withheld consent to searches using automated robots. However,

96. Id. (contending robot access through Register was not authorized).
97. Id.at 405.
98. See id. at 438. Originally, Judge Parker was assigned to write the court's decision.
During deliberations, he had agreed with the other two judges on the panel. In the process of
drafting the court's opinion, however, he changed his mind. The other two members of the
panel remained convinced that the trial court should be affirmed. Judge Parker died prior to
the issuance of the final opinion. As a result, the other judges appended his draft to the
court's opinion, which, in many ways, is a more complete account than that of the court. Id.
at 395 n.1.
99. Id.at 439 (directing the district court to modify the third paragraph of the injuction
on remand).
100. RegisterII, 356 F.3d at 436.

101. Id.at 437.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the trial court analyzed the language in Register's terms of use.105
Register's terms of use limiting anyone's use of its Web site or database
prohibited using the WHOIS data to "enable high volume, automated,
electronic processes that apply to Register.com... ",106 The trial court held
that the temporal aspect of the language did not withhold consent to
automatically collect information from the WHOIS database, but only to
use the data after collection through an automated system.' 0 7 However, the
trial court held, and •the Second Circuit •affirmed,108that at least as of the date
The trial court implies
the lawsuit was filed, consent was withdrawn.
when Register
litigation
of
the
the
filing
prior
to
that there was a date
explicitly withdrew any implied consent.
Whether consumers rely upon the trial court's version or the Second
Circuit's opinion, either through the two remaining judges or Judge Parker,
trespass to chattels is of limited value not only for businesses whose
databases have suffered invasion, but for consumers. First, the question of
implied consent raises difficulty. If, as in Register II, the court will imply
consent through some "click through" boilerplate and require the person to
file litigation or take some other affirmative action to revoke consent the
consumer did not know was given, the cause of action becomes almost
useless.
Furthermore, as Register II holds, when someone interferes by
unauthorized use or intermeddling with a chattel, for liability purposes, the
owner of the chattel must show actual damages. 1 10 On one encouraging
note, the court found that inserting a software robot would by definition
interfere with and consequently damage Register's use of its system."II The
trial court spent more time than the circuit court discussing the harm to the
chattel itself. 112 The trial court held that "evidence of mere possessory
interference is sufficient to demonstrate the quantum of harm necessary to
establish a claim for trespass to chattels."' 113 The court was not bothered by
Register's inability to document the exact extent of interference; rather it

105. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. (Register 1), 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (addressing posted policies and terms of use).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. See id. (noting the importance of the term barring future automated processes).
108. Id.; see also Register If, 356 F.3d at 404-05,437 n.56.
109. See Register I, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
110. See Register II, 356 F.3d at 437-38 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
218); Registerl, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
111. See Register II, 356 F.3d at 438 (describing the trespass to Register's systems).
112. Compare Register 1, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 249-50 (describing harm caused by
unauthorized access to Register's computer system), with Register II, 356 F.3d at 393
(accepting the harm without question).
113. Register 1, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
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was satisfied that Verio did not dispute the robot used some of Register's
system capacity. 114 For the consumer, there likewise should be no difficulty
in showing that the insertion of spyware uses some of the computer's
capacity and, in other ways, interferes with the use of the computer. 1 5 But
will this be enough to make the spyware perpetrator liable?
The trial court in Register I,116 as well as the Second Circuit in
Register 11,117 imported reasoning from a case from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California. 118 In that case, eBay
sought an injunction against Bidder's Edge ("BE") to prohibit BE from
accessing the eBay Web site with automated search technology. 119 Unlike
Register.com, eBay's terms of use included a prohibition on the use of "any
robot, spider, other automatic device, or manual process to monitor or copy
our web pages or the content contained herein without our prior expressed
written permission." 120 eBay, in its complaint,
alleged a variety of causes
121
of action including trespass to chattels.
Interestingly, this court began with the proposition that "electronic
signals generated by the [defendants'] activities were sufficiently tangible
to support a trespass cause of action."
Most courts are satisfied that
invading invisibly 123
with electronic signals is a sufficient invasion for
trespass to chattels. However, the court's reasoning may prove helpful to
consumers in a place that requires aphysical trespass.
The court in eBay v. Bidder's Edge commenced its analysis with two
114. See id.
115. See supra Part II.
116. Register I, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
117. Register I, 356 F.3d at 436 n.54.
118. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
119. Id. at 1063-64.
120. Id. at 1060 (citation to eBay User Agreement omitted). The court recognized that it
was unclear whether BE had agreed to eBay's terms of use when it began using its
automated system. Id.
121. Id.at 1063.
122. Id. at 1069 (citing Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that electronic signals generated over a telephone line are sufficient for
use in a trespass to chattels claim). In Thrifty-Tel a long-distance telephone company
brought an action against parents based upon the children's use of computer access to make
long-distance telephone calls without accruing charges. The court held that "[t]respass to
chattel, although seldom employed as a tort theory in California (indeed, there is nary a
mention of the tort in Witkin's Summary of California Law), lies where an intentional
interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused injury."
Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (citation omitted). The court then goes through the
history of trespass to chattel. Id. at 473 n.6. The court also cites to Indiana and Washington
state courts which criminalize the activity of computer trespass. Id. at 473 n.7 (citing State
v. McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1985) and State v. Riley, 846 P.2d 1365, 1373
(Wash. 1993)).
123. See, e.g., eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473.
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' 24
elements necessary "for trespass based on accessing a computer system."'
First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant "intentionally and without
authorization interfered with plaintiffs possessory interest in the computer
system...",125 Second, plaintiff must prove that "defendant's unauthorized
use proximately resulted in damage to plaintiff."'126 The court seemed to
authorize consent as an affirmative defense. 12 7 It intertwined that
affirmative defense with the "without authorization" portion of the first
element. 2 8 In applying the law to the facts of the case, the court held that
even if eBay's Web site were publicly accessible, the fact that eBay
"explicitly notifies automated visitors that their access is not permitted..
and BE continued to use an automated system "even after eBay
demanded BE terminate such activity. .. ,,130 eBay demonstrated that BE's
activities lacked authorization and exceeded the scope of any granted
previously by eBay. 13 1 Unlike Register, eBay "repeatedly and explicitly
notified BE" to cease using an automated system. 32 While this course of
action may be preferable, in the case of an individual owner of a computer
who is unaware of the placement of spyware on that computer, if a court
requires repeated revocation of any purported consent, the consumer could
never prevail in a trespass to chattels case. In Register I & II and eBay v.
Bidder's Edge, the plaintiffs maintained Web presences, therefore inviting
people to enter their Web sites. Individual owners of computers invite Web
presences to visit their computers by accessing Web sites. Spyware
perpetrators will argue analogously to the perpetrators in eBay v. Bidder's
Edge and Register I & II that the consumers implicitly gave consent.
All three of these courts seem to gloss over the requirement of
damage to the chattel itself They seem to assume that the use of another's
computer constitutes intermeddling that creates sufficient damage for
liability.' The eBay v. Bidder's Edge court found that even though eBay
does not claim BE's sending between 80,000 and 100,000 requests to

124. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
125. Id.at 1069-70.
126. Id. at 1070.
127. See id.
128. See id.

129. Id.
130. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
131. Id. The court cited City of Amsterdam v. Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd., 882 F. Supp.
1273, 1281 (E.D.N.Y 1995), for the proposition that exceeding the scope of consent can
subject one to liability in trespass to chattels even though there is not a complete conversion
of the chattel. The court also referred to Civic Western Corp. v. Zila Industries, Inc., 66 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 17 (1977), in the context of trespass to real property, holding that when limited
consent is given and the defendant exceeds that limited consent, a trespass has occurred.
132. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
133. Id.at 1071.
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eBay's computer systems each day
has led to any physical damage to eBay's computer system, nor does
eBay provide any evidence to support the claim that it may have lost
revenues or customers based on this use, eBay's claim is that BE's use
is appropriating eBay's personal property by using valuable bandwidth
and capacity and necessarily f4mpromising eBay's ability to use that
capacity for its own purposes.
The court reasoned that even though BE's use of the system may only be a
small portion of that system's capacity, "BE has nonetheless deprived eBay
of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own
purposes."' 135 The court went on to find that eBay need not wait for a
disaster before applying for relief. 136 The court seems to hold that using a
portion of the computer system to the exclusion of the rightful owner is
sufficient to qualify as trespass to chattels.
Another case from a federal court in California demonstrates the
attempt to use trespass to chattel to reach through the spyware or robot
creator to the beneficiary of that spyware's spying.137 In Oyster Software,
the plaintiff claimed that Forms Processing, Inc. ("FPI") had contracted
with a company named Top-Ten Promotions ("Top Ten") to find metatags
on Oyster Software's ("Oyster") site for FPI to use so that those searching
the Web would find FPI's Web site rather than Oyster's. 138 FPI moved for
partial summary judgment alleging that Oyster had failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact because it was Top-Ten's robots that went to Oyster's
Web site and that Oyster had presented no evidence that the robots
interfered with Oyster's computer systems. 1 39 First, the court denied the
motion because it could not determine whether Top-Ten was vicariously
liable as an employee of FPI or not liable due to an independent contractor
relationship. 14 0 [E]ven if FPI knew nothing about Top-Ten's initial act of
sending robots to Oyster's web site and copying its metatags, it may still be
liable for Top-Ten's trespass if Oyster can persuade a jury that Top-Ten
was an employee rather than a consultant."' 141 The court held that such
determinations are generally a question of fact. 14 2 The plaintiff, in a similar
case, will need to develop facts sufficient to show that the spyware
134. Id. (citations omitted).
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id.at 1072.
137. Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C000724(JCS), 2001 WL
1736382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6,2001).
138. Id. at *2.

139. Id. at *11.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 815 F.2d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir.
1987)).
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14 3
perpetrator is in fact an employee and not an independent contractor.
The court then considered the amount of interference necessary to
sustain a trespass claim. Relying upon the analysis in eBay v. Bidder's
Edge, the court found that under California law, minimal interference based
merely on evidence of use may be sufficient to support trespass to
For
chattels, 144 and the proper damages analysis considers lost profits.
an individual whose computer is invaded by spyware, there will be no lost
profits. Consequently, the Oyster case may not have any value for
consumer protection.
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
distinguished Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. from eBay v. Bidder's
Edge, and gave consumers a well-developed outline of the argument that
unauthorized invasion of a computer can be trespass to chattels. 14 6 The
court set forth an almost logical progression.
"The computer is a piece of tangible personal property."' 4 7 Despite
the fact that computers did not exist when trespass to chattels was first
developed under the common law, and even though computers are
"operated by mysterious electronic impulses ...[,]the principles should not
'4 8
be too different."'
The court reasoned that since "the electronic impulses can do damage
to the computer or to its function in a comparable way to taking a hammer
to a piece of machinery, then it is no stretch to recognize the damage as
trespass to chattels and provide a legal remedy for it.' 149 What difference,
the court asks, is there to bombarding a computer with electronic
information in the form of data and any other type of trespass? The court
does not follow through the same list of physical items leading to trespass
as in Thrifty-Tel, 15 but it might have. In Thrifty-Tel, the court went from
physical touching, to dust particles, to microscopic particles or smoke, to
signals showing that computer data could well
sound waves, to electronic
15 1
be the basis for trespass.
The Ticketmaster court distinguished its facts from eBay v. Bidder's
Edge in holding that there was no obstruction to the basic function or harm

143. The plaintiff must use state law concerning independent contractor status to meet
this burden.
144. Oyster Software, 2001 WL 1736382 at *13.
145. Id. at*13 n.11.
146. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 n.6.
151. Id.
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to the chattel in Ticketmaster as there had been in eBay v. Bidder's Edge
because there was no interference with the regular use of Ticketmaster's
equipment. 52 The court does, however, summarize eBay v. Bidder's Edge
in a helpful manner: "the harm to the equipment foreseen was to 1its
53
intended function, not the physical characteristics of the computer."'
Consequently, in a trespass to chattels case, a consumer only needs to show
that the insertion of spyware impaired the function of the equipment.
Apparently, in California federal courts, trespass to chattels based upon the
use of spyware seems alive, well, and available to consumers.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of California muddied the water
with a decision in an email case.154 The Intel Corp majority opinion
distinguished eBay v. Bidder's Edge on the basis that some injury must be
shown.155 The court claimed that Oyster incorrectly applied California law
in stating that actionable trespass to chattel exists simply based on use.156
The California Supreme Court majority opinion clearly requires some
impairment of the chattel or the chattel's function.157 The court also refused
to extend California's common law trespass to chattels to include
"otherwise harmless electronic communication whose contents are
objectionable."' 5 8 In essence, this decision eviscerates any potential
trespass to chattels cause of action for consumers in California state courts.
159
Two strong dissenting opinions followed the Intel Corp holding.
Both dissenters believed that trespass to chattels should be actionable due
to the cost imposed upon the plaintiff by the interloper's use of the
system. 16 What Intel Corp demonstrates is that the tort of trespass to
chattels is a developing field and consumers
using 161
it must be careful to
•
demonstrate the elements, especially lack of consent,
as well as damage
to the chattel itself. 62 While trespass to chattels may be the strongest tort
action available to consumers, it is not adequate to the task of imposing
sufficient liability on spyware perpetrators to cause them to cease their
activities.
152. Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 WL 1887522 at *4.
155. Id.
154. See generally Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003) (holding
"trespass to chattels... does not encompass, and should not be extended to encompass, an
electronic communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs
its functioning.").
155. Id.at 306.
156. Id.at 307 n.5.
157. Id.
158. Id.at 308.
159. See id.at 313 (Brown, J., dissenting); id.
at 325 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
160. See id.at 323, 327.
161. See, e.g., eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
162. See Intel Corp., 71 P.3d at 306.
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B. Spyware Under the Computer Fraudand Abuse Act
The CFAA is a set of eight criminal and civil causes of action that
prevent unauthorized access to "protected computers" of United States
163
government agencies, financial institutions, and private party end-users.
A "protected computer" under the CFAA is one used either exclusively by
the U.S. government or a financial institution, 164 or one "which is used in
interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer
located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects
1 65
interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States."
End-users who are victims of spyware can only assert civil causes of action
under the CFAA if the unauthorized invader has caused:
(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period... aggregating
at least $5,000.00 in value; (ii) the modification or impairment or
potential modification or impairment of the medical examination,
diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (iii) physical
injury to any person; (iv) a threat to public safety or health; or (v)
damage affecting a government computer system used by or for a
governmental entity in furtherance 6 the administration of justice,
national defense, or national security.
1. Meeting the Damage Requirement for Civil Claims
Spyware victims can assert civil claims under the CFAA to recover
damages against unauthorized computer users whenever the invader
directly or indirectly causes some physical harm to befall any person
through the unauthorized use. 167 Absent actual physical injuries, most civil
litigants will be required to show $5,000 in aggregate damages over a oneyear period. 168 This will be a high hurdle for most litigants, especially
considering
169 that the cost of a top-of-the-line end-user system is less than
$4,000. The complete destruction of a computer by malicious code may
not be sufficiently damaging to permit an end-user to assert a cause of

163.
164.
165.
166.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
See id. § 1030(e)(2)(A).
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. III 2003).
See id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)-(v); Anne P. Mitchell, Vendor Liabilityfor Advertising in
Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, 22 J.MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 137, 138-39
(2003) (arguing that assigning liability to vendors is a viable way to address the spyware
problem).
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (Supp. III 2003) (emphasis added).
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
169. See Dell, http://www.dell.com/content/products/features.aspx/to-xpsnbml 710?
c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). Gaming systems are one of the
higher-end computer products purchased by end-users because of their technologically
advanced processors, video cards, and sound cards.
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action under the CFAA. 1 7 0 End-users will likely have to either band
together in a class action to aggregate their damages or claim that extensive
data has been destroyed and must be restored by -a forensic computer
technician. While both of these damage calculation strategies will help
spyware victims assert claims under the CFAA, the large $5,000 damage
requirement, in conjunction with the cost of finding an expert to testify,
will likely foreclose the majority of end-users from7 being able to file
1
successful CFAA actions against spyware distributors.1
Banding together to form a class action may be possible when
particularly offensive spyware or computer virus programs destroy
identifiable
numerous hard
.. information from
.
172
... drives or steal personally
multiple users in a short period of time. Spyware victims will likely need
to aggregate damages because claimants cannot bring a cause of action
under the CFAA unless the defendant causes $5,000 of damage to a single
protected computer.173 If the class can assert damage to a single protected
computer, then all injured class members may bring claims even if their
individual damages are less than $5,000.174 This may, however, be difficult
given spyware's ability to impact end-users all around the world. It may be
unlikely that multiple victimized end-users will be aware of others who are
similarly situated, enabling them to aggregate their damages in a class
action. Furthermore, the CFAA forces individual victims to act quickly
since the statute of limitations from the discovery of damages is only two
years.17 5 The CFAA damage calculation mechanism also limits damage
aggregation to meet the $5,000 requirement to a one-year period for all
plaintiffs. 176 Plaintiffs will likely be unaware of both of these provisions.
Therefore, if plaintiffs' damages are sufficient and if they can afford it,
170. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Computer FraudandAbuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. FED. 101,132 (2005).
171. This could be changed if inflationary forces overcome declining equipment costs
and cause the value of the average computer system to exceed $5,000. However, inflation
would have to cause the price of the average hard drive to exceed $5,000 since in nearly all
cases, absent a fried motherboard or CPU, the aggrieved end-user could just swap in a new
hard drive and his or her computer would run like new.
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
173. See Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F.Supp. 2d 667, 681 (E.D.Tex.
2001) The case held that:
no one can bring a cause of action unless the defendant causes an aggregate of
$5,000 "damage" to a protected computer. If defendant causes such damage, then
any injured person may bring a claim even if, his or her own "damage," is less
than $5,000. Accordingly, Plaintiffs must offer summary judgment evidence of a
transmission to a computer that caused loss of at least $5,000.

Id.
174. Id.
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (Supp. III 2003).
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
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they will be more likely to take their own actions to court themselves rather
than as a class. If spyware victims want to have the best possible chances of
recovery, they must act quickly to find other similarly situated plaintiffs to
assert a class action claim under the CFAA's numerous protective causes of
action. Plaintiffs will likely only use the class option if there is a
particularly widespread product that drives a class action lawyer to assert
such a suit. Otherwise, plaintiffs are only likely to use this option if they
know someone else personally who has been similarly victimized, an
unlikely, but possible occurrence if the virus or spyware spreads by email
contact lists.
End-users asserting CFAA claims on their own will be forced to
argue that their lost data caused such a grave inconvenience that their total
losses exceeded $5,000. 177 "Loss" is defined under the CFAA as "any
reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an
offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program,
system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
interruption of service." 178 The definition of "loss" appears to cover the
costs of identifying the extent of damage to the end-user's compromised
17 9
system and restoring the end-user's system to its previous condition.
Even if an end-user purchases a brand new computer, it is unlikely that the
end-user's losses would even exceed $4,000. End-users could, however,
exceed the $5,000 loss requirement by claiming
that valuable data has been
180
lost or compromised, destroying its value. Further end-user losses may
result if personally identifiable information is compromised, such as
banking or credit card information, and subsequently used to make
unauthorized purchases. 18 1 Finally, in some instances, end-users may be
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
178. 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(11) (2000).
179. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001)
(holding that appellees suffered a detriment and a disadvantage constituting a loss under the
CFAA by having to expend substantial sums to assess the extent, if any, of the physical
damage to their Web site caused by appellants' intrusion). The court further held that the
detriment, disadvantage, or physical damage caused by appellant's intrusion into appellee's
system constitutes a loss under the CFAA. "That the physical components were not
damaged is fortunate, but it does not lessen the loss represented by consultant fees.
Congress's use of the disjunctive, 'damage or loss,' confirms that it anticipated recovery in
cases involving other than purely physical damage." Id.But see In re Intuit Privacy Litig.,
138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1281 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (explaining loss means "irreparable damage"
and any other interpretation "would render the term 'damage' superfluous"); Register 1, 126
F. Supp. 2d at 252 n. 12 (noting lost business or goodwill could not constitute loss absent the
impairment or unavailability of data or systems).
180. Damage is defined under the CFAA as "any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2000).
181. Stephanie Byers, Note, The Internet: Privacy Lost, Identities Stolen, 40 BRANDEIS
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able to meet the $5,000 requirement by hiring a computer forensic
technician to restore their data or to track down the compromised dataalthough what consumer would pay $5,000 with the hope of recovering it
during litigation?' 8 2 Moreover, if the consumer can replace the system for
less than $5,000, the defendant may argue that the plaintiff failed to
mitigate loss by hiring a technician rather than simply buying a new
system. While the definition of "loss" includes these costs, economics (and
common sense) counsels end-users to buy a new computer instead. The
result could be that end-users are inadvertently denied from asserting a
cause of action under the favorable CFAA statute.
Unlike individual end-users, large corporations and other businesses
that are victimized by spyware will usually be able to satisfy the $5,000
damage requirement under the CFAA. 18Given the size of corporate
information technology systems, even a minimal spyware attack could
create significant damages as numerous computer technicians purge
spyware from the systems, restore data, and repair any security holes that
the spyware may have created. 184 Computer technicians are compensated
generously, and hiring a single technician for a week would likely exceed
$5,000 in damages notwithstanding the compromised data's diminution in
value and potential public relations damages or derivative liability if
spyware steals personally identifiable customer information. Further, it
makes sense to fix the system rather than, as in the case of the consumer,
buy a new system. Due to the size and value of their IT networks,
businesses and corporations are the best suited candidates for asserting
causes of action under the CFAA. Whenever a business experiences an IT
network violation by spyware, hackers, or computer viruses, the company's
L.J. 141,150 (2001).

182. See EF CulturalTravel BV, 274 F.3d at 585.
183. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § (a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
184. See Dave Piscitello, Keep Spyware Off Your Business Network, SMALLBIZPPIPELINE,
(Jan. 10, 2005) (on file with Journal) (providing an example of how rapidly spywareinduced productivity loss and helpdesk costs can accumulate). For instance:
[a] user installs a free toolbar and web accelerator, and inadvertently installs
spyware embedded in these freebies. The particular pests he has installed prove to
be removal resistant: attempts to remove the pests damage critical operating
system files, such as the Windows Registry, dynamic link libraries, and TCP/IP
configuration files. The spyware render the PC inoperable.
The user calls the help desk. Support staff invest an estimated 2-4 hours
investigating, repairing or rebuilding the PC's primary partition, and restoring the
user's local work environment, including applications and data files.
The total time cost for this incident is about one half to one employee-day-that's
assuming that the employee is unproductive during this repair time. An
organization with 1,000 employees might get 10 such incidents per work day;
some back-of-the-envelope calculations yield a spyware cost of $512,000 to $1.24
million.
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legal group should consider filing a cause of action under the CFAA.
2. Civil Causes of Action Applicable to Spyware
The CFAA contains eight separate civil and criminal statutes
generally protecting end-users from malicious Internet users who
intentionally access computers without authorization or exceed their
authorization and cause damages to the computer. One section of the
CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), is particularly tailored to protect endusers against spyware by enabling end-users to assert causes of action
against a person who "knowingly causes the transmission of a program,
information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct,
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected
computer." 85 A protected computer is one that is used in interstate or
foreign commerce or communication. 86 Spyware distributors create and
distribute spyware programs as addendums to other desirable freeware and
shareware programs.
If spyware mines data without the end-user's
authorization or exceeds the end-user's authorization, then the spyware
entities have knowingly created and distributed a program that has caused
damage without authorization, thereby violating §1030(a)(5)(A)(i) of the
CFAA.
CFAA spyware suits hinge on two elements: the $5,000 aggregate
damage requirement discussed in the previous section and the issue of
authorization. Exceeding authorized access is defined under the CFAA as
"access[ing] a computer with authorization and... us[ing] such access to
obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled
so to obtain or alter."' 18 It is foreseeable that a multitude of spyware
programs could be accused of either operating without authorization or
exceeding their authorized access since they are installed onto an enduser's machine without the end-user's knowledge.' 89 Developers may be
liable for spyware applications that secretly install programs for damages
that those programs create under the CFAA, assuming that they cause more
than $5,000 in damage to a class of plaintiffs within a one-year period.

185. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2000). See also Credentials Plus v. Calderone, 230 F.
Supp. 2d 890, 906 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (holding that plaintiff's computer is a protected
computer under the CFAA because it is used to send and receive email to customers
throughout the United States).
187. See Krause, supra note 28, at 60.
188. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2000). See also EF Cultural Travel BV,274 F.3d at 582
(affirming that competitor exceeded authorized access when using program to glean prices
from plaintiff's Web site).
189. See Mathias Kiang, Spyware: Payingfor Software with Our Privacy, 17 INT'L REV.
L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 313, 314-15 (2003).
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Spyware programs that obtain an end-user's consent during the
installation process are less likely to be liable under the CFAA. 190 While
the CFAA does permit a cause of action against spyware that "exceeds
authorized access," spyware companies are able to insulate themselves
from this liability by openly disclosing in the EULA in broad terms, an
intention to mine data or install other programs on an end-user's
computer. 19 1 Spyware companies can bury these contractual provisions
deep within legal boilerplate contracts that end-users are unlikely to
read. 192 Therefore, while the spyware obtains contractual consent through a
purchaser's duty to read, 193 the end-user arguably does not have sufficient
notice of the spyware's intentions or even its existence. Even when endusers read EULA agreements, it is still unlikely that they will comprehend
the spyware's intentions, or even its existence, if the data mining provisions
are stated in extremely broad terms. In these situations, a determining court
will examine specific contractual terms that the end-user has probably
never actually read before. As long as the spyware's actions fall within the

190. Id. at 314-16.
191. See id. See also I.Lan Sys. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338
(D. Mass. 2002) (enforcing terms of clickwrap agreement where the assent is explicit and
holding that clickwrap license agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts). The
court stated:
To be sure, shrinkwrap and clickwrap license agreements share the defect of any
standardized contract-they are susceptible to the inclusion of terms that border
on the unconscionable-but that is not the issue in this case. The only issue before
the Court is whether clickwrap license agreements are an appropriate way to form
contracts, and the Court holds they are. In short, I.Lan explicitly accepted the
clickwrap license agreement when it clicked on the box stating "I agree."
Id.; ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing U.C.C. § 2-204
(1994) and stating that "[a] vendor, as master of the offer, may. . . propose limitations on
the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance"); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 311-14 (Wash. 2000) (holding that where a vendor and
purchaser utilized a license agreement in prior course of dealing, a shrinkwrap license
agreement constituted contract formation under § 2-204, not contract alteration under § 2207). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding
that because plaintiff is not a merchant, additional or different terms contained in the
Standard Terms did not become part of the parties' agreement unless plaintiff expressly
agreed to them); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that the parties' conduct in shipping, receiving and paying for product
demonstrates existence of contract and that the box top license constitutes proposal for
additional terms under § 2-207 which requires express agreement by purchaser); Ariz. Retail
Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding when
vendor entered into contract by agreeing to ship goods, or at least by shipping goods to
buyer, license agreement constitutes proposal to modify agreement under U.C.C. § 2-209,
which requires express assent by buyer); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d
1201, 1206 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that single-use language on product's label was
proposed modification under § 2-209, which requires express assent by purchaser).
192. See [Lan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
193. Id.
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94
disclosed terms, the spyware developers should not face any liability.'
Thus, the CFAA's authorization requirement gives spyware developers a
substantial ability to control their ultimate liability by disclosing their
spyware's capabilities and data mining intentions. While this theoretically
protects consumer interests by encouraging disclosure, spyware's ability to
abuse the process by hiding disclosure clauses within boilerplate contracts
gives spyware developers an unfair advantage under the law.
Although the authorization requirement will impede some spyware
victims' CFAA actions, many actions will not be foreclosed because most
spyware programs do not disclose their software's capabilities in an EULA.
Since most spyware mines data on an end-user's computer without their
knowledge or consent, most spyware applications never disclose their
presence to end-users. These unauthorized spyware programs violate the
CFAA, and victims will be able to recover civil damages if they can meet
the $5,000 damage requirement. If enough successful actions are filed,
more spyware developers will incorporate the EULA disclosure model into
that of the bundled freeware or shareware program. Such an outcome will
likely cause consumers more harm than good because of spyware's ability
to meet its legal contractual disclosure requirements via the burying
technique. A more effective solution would have to originate with the
legislature. The legislature could solve this problem and protect both endusers and spyware developers at the same time by adopting a set of
spyware EULA disclosure requirements to ensure that end-users actually
have adequate
notice when they install and consent to spyware
95
installations.1

C.

Spyware Under the Stored CommunicationsAct
196
Spyware arguably violates the Stored Communications Act
because it mines personal information from an end-user's communication
facility, be it a computer, cell phone, or PDA, without the end-user's
consent. The Stored Communications Act provides a civil cause of action
for parties victimized by unauthorized third-party access to their stored

194. Id.
195. See Infra Part IV.

196. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA PATRIOT Act") of 2001 was passed in the
wake of the events of September 11 and amended the Stored Communications Act, thus
relaxing the constraints of the Stored Communications Act. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§
209-210, 212, 220, 223, 505, 815 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections
throughout 18 U.S.C.). For example, sections 210 and 211--codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2703(c)(2)(A)-(F) and 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(D)-expanded the type of information that
government entities can obtain from electronic communication service providers without a
court order.
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electronic communications.1 97 The Stored Communications Act is intended
to protect end-user digital privacy in email, IM, file transfer protocol, and
other Internet based communications when
198 the information is stored on the
accessible.
not
is
and
machine
end-user's
To maintain a successful cause of action under the Stored
Communications Act, 199 a spyware victim must show: (1) intentional; (2)
unauthorized access; (3) to a facility providing an electronic
communication service; (4) that obtains a wire or electronic
communication; (5) in electronic storage. 20 The legislative history of the
Stored Communications Act indicates that it was intended to include
"storage in any other form including storage of magnetic tapes, disks or
other media.',20 This provision, however, does not apply to conduct that is
authorized "by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service" or by the "user" of that service.2 02 By design,
spyware programs seek to mine the information without explicit
"authorization" from the end-user. 20 3 Although some spyware programs do
acquire "authorization" by disclosing their software's capabilities in an
EULA, many do not. Spyware programs that access stored electronic
communications on an end-user's system without previously disclosing the
software's
capabilities and intentions violate the Stored Communications
4
20

Act.

197. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (requiring a violation be made either knowingly or
intentionally to justify relief).
198. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
199. Offense.-Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby
obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
200. The term "electronic storage" is defined to mean "any temporary, intermediate
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof' and "any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service
for purposes of backup protection of such communication... " 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000).
201. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 16 (1986). The legislative history indicates that a
communication is considered to be "in storage" both when it is temporarily stored on the
computer of the electronic communications service prior to receipt by the recipient of the
communication and when it is stored on the computer after receipt.
202. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2000).
203. See generally Schultz, supra note 18.
204. While multitudes of spyware violate the Stored Communications Act, the degree of
guilt hinges upon the nature of the accessed communications. Spyware programmers cannot
prove that the end-user intended to give the spyware programs access to the electronic
communications. In most cases, spyware programmers must also overcome the presumption
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1. First Element: Intent
The first element of the Stored Communications Act requires a
spyware company to have acted with the intent of accessing the stored
communications on the end-user's machine. In most cases this element is
proved with ease because spyware programs are purposefully written with
the intent to find and copy specific information on an end-user's
machine, 2°and then to transmit it to the spyware system. 206 Spyware

companies will argue in defense that their spyware programs mistakenly
and, consequently, unintentionally send back extra data that they did not
request. This argument, however, should be easily resolved by analyzing
the application code to determine if the program intentionally sought to
mine the purported extra data. While courts may permit spyware creators to
use this defense for subsets of data that the spyware was not supposed to
mine, it cannot be used for all mined data since spyware programs are
designed to collect data. Thus, spyware victims will be able to satisfy the
intent element in most unauthorized spyware data mining cases.
2. Second Element: Authorization
The second element of the Stored Communications Act requires a
spyware program to mine data without an end-user's authorization.
Spyware programs that do not disclose their presence or their intentions to
mine an end-user's data violate the authorization prong because they
operate without the end-user's consent, a necessary element of
"authorization." Spyware can obtain "authorization" either through legal
authorization in the form of a government issued search warrant or through
an end-user's consent. While end-users may initially consent to the
installation of freeware or shareware programs that later install spyware,
the end-user certainly does not explicitly, or arguably even implicitly,
consent to the piggybacking spyware program's mining of personal
electronic communications stored on the end-user's machine. Some courts
have found that although the interception of electronic communications
does not require explicit consent, consent can only be implied if the end2 7
on
installedgive
When spyware
and actually
has notice
user
theyis cannot
the consent.
end-user's0 knowledge,
withoutgives
machines
end-users'
that spyware by its very definition, implies that the actions were taken without the enduser's "authorization."
205. In this context, "machine" could encompasses desktops, servers, laptops, cell
phones, PDA, electronic devices, hand-held devices, and computers.
206. The spyware program can elect to transmit the information to devices other than a
server. The focus is not on the particular medium upon which the spyware's program
communication is stored, but rather that it is being transmitted to a third-party device
without "authorization" from the end-user.
207. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9,20 (1st Cir. 2003).
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actual consent because they do not have notice. As a result, whenever a
spyware program operates without at least giving the end-user notice of its
installation and its intention to mine data, the Stored Communications
Act's lack of authorization will be met. But, what is sufficient notice? Does
a boilerplate "click through" contract on a Web site suffice?
In some instances, however, end-users will consent to the installation
20 8
of a program that includes a spyware component, such as Kazaa.
However, while the end-user consents to the installation of the program
itself, the end-user has no way of knowing what the spyware will record.
Courts determining whether end-users have given actual consent will take
either of the following inconsistent positions: (1) by consenting to the tied
program's installation, the end-user impliedly consents to the spyware's
data mining, or (2) the mere use of a spyware laden program is insufficient
to impute actual consent for the spyware to ravage all of the information
stored on an end-user's system. The current trend in the courts suggests that
they will likely require spyware to give the end-user notice of specific
electronic communications that it will mine in order to acquire actual
consent. 209 But, if this notice need only be buried in boilerplate contract,
will it have any value to the consumer?
Even if a court finds that a spyware program received actual end-user
consent to mine data, spyware developers can still violate the Stored
Communications Act by exceeding an end-user's authorization. End-users
can grant spyware partial consent to mine different subsets of information
stored on their facilities based on the express terms of the use agreement. If
spyware receives only partial consent, data not expressly included in the
agreement will be off-limits to mining. 2 10 The ability to grant limited
consent is supported by cases interpreting the Wiretap Act, which have
208. See Scumware, supra note 17.
209. The issue of whether end-users have authorized spyware to mine stored personal
information and electronic communications will be the focus of legal disputes until
Congress or the States mandate specific required disclosures. Due to the Intemet's global
reach, a mandatory disclosure law passed by Congress would enable spyware companies to
create and issue one version of their software to be distributed over the Internet regardless of
the end-user's location. The disclosures would be included in the EUJLA or in the
download's read-me file in bold letters at the top of the page. Mandatory disclosures would
assist both end-users and spyware creators because the end-users would be able to make
informed decisions, and the spyware creators would be absolved from liability under the
Stored Communications Act as long as the program only mines data stipulated in the
disclosure paragraph. Without a statutorily mandated rule for spyware disclosures, end-users
will remain unaware of the extent to which their information is being mined, and spyware
creators will continue operating under the constant threat of class action lawsuits. This is not
a preferable operating environment for either of the parties involved.
210. Furthermore, if the spyware program is transmitting a social security number and
related information, the spyware program must be encrypted and comply with any
regulations pertaining to the transmission of personal information.
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held that a third-party data interceptor does not obtain end-user consent
where the user consents to the mining of nonpersonally identifiable
information, but refuses to permit the mining of personally identifiable
information. 2 11 Courts have also held that consent cannot be inferred from
the mere use of a product or the purchase of a service. 2 12 The requirement
of actual consent, while never explicitly held necessary under the Stored
Communications Act, should be applied because both the Stored
Communications Act and the Wiretap Act are part of the ECPA and share
the same definitions. 2 13 Therefore, both the courts and the legislature
require spyware companies to either disclose specific subsets of files they
will be mining or to obtain broad consent without any limitations to all files
contained on an end-user's machine. If this consent is not obtained, then
spyware companies run the risk of exceeding their authorization on the
end-user's system and violating the second prong of the Stored
Communications Act.
Unfortunately, spyware companies can circumvent the authorization
element by drafting EULAs that include language granting the spyware
blanket access to mine all data on an end-user's machine.
Spyware
programs use numerous deceptive techniques to elicit such "explicit" enduser consent, such as including a voluminous EULA that only describes the
program's capabilities or by stating in extremely broad language that the
program can search for and use end-user data. A particularly insidious trick
is to bury the spyware consent clause within the tied freeware or shareware
program's EULA. Most end-users faced with a contract consisting of more
than a few pages are unlikely to read every single page or understand all of
the legalese they have read. Most read none of the EULA, but simply click
the "I agree" button to begin using the application.
3. Third Element: Facility Providing an Electronic Communication
Service
The Stored Communications Act's third element requires plaintiffs to
prove that when their data was mined, their system was operating as a
facility providing electronic communication services to the spyware
program. A court must find that the end-user's machine is being used as a
facility through which "electronic communication service[s]" are being
"provided" when the spyware program accesses and transmits files stored
211. Pharmatrak,329 F.3d at 20.
212. Id.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000) (defining "electronic storage"); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1)
(Supp. III 2000) (incorporating into § 2711 of the Wiretap Act all the definitions found in §
2510, including the definition of "electronic storage").
214. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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on an end-user's computer.2 15 The Stored Communications Act defines an
"electronic communication service" as "any service which provides to
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications. ' 2 16 Under this definition, spyware programs operating on
end-users' computers utilize an "electronic communication service"
because, without the "facility" provided by the end-user's machine, no
communication could transpire between the spyware program and the
entity to which it transmits the end-user's data. 217 Since spyware uses endusers' machines as facilities through which electronic communication
services are provided, courts will likely hold that spyware programs that
successfully mine and transmit data from an
end-user's machine satisfy the
2 18
Stored Communications Act's third prong.

4. Fourth Element: Access to a Wire or Electronic Communication
The Stored Communications Act's fourth element is satisfied if a
spyware program "obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage .
,,219 Most
spyware programs will meet this element because they operate by
accessing,
recording, and
transmitting
end-users'
"electronic
communications," including Internet browsing habits, instant messaging
conversations, and email. The Stored Communications Act defines
"electronic communications" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or
in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or hotooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce .... ,20 Spyware

215. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1)(2000).
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (Supp III 2003)
(incorporating into § 2511 of the Wiretap Act the definition of "electronics communications
service" found in section § 2510(15)).
217. See In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (stating
that 18 U.S.C. § 2701 "does not require that there be a 'communication' at all." Since the
primary act required for violation of § 2701 is the act of accessing electronically stored data,
the existence or absence of communication is irrelevant).
218. Spyware applications mine end-user transmissions without consent, which permits
the court to find that the end-user's machine in such instances are acting as a facility for
electronic communication services. On the other hand, if the end-user is utilizing technology
that is not spyware driven, then the argument that the end-user's machine is a facility for
providing electronic communication is not as strong. In this context the focus is not on
unauthorized data mining of end-user personal information, but rather on the transmission of
communications; and the end-user's machine is serving as a conduit for these
communications.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2).
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining "electronic communication"); 18 U.S.C. §
2711(1) (incorporating into § 2511 of the Wiretap Act the definition of "electronic
communication" found in § 2510(12)).
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programs intercept files either before or after an electronic communication
has transpired while the files are stored in a Web browser cache on the host
machine. End-users' computers are electromagnetic systems that transfer
signals from program to program or from end-user to end-user. As long as
an end-user's computer is on the Interet, it is a system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce. Therefore, whenever spyware mines enduser information that has been or will be transmitted to another user, the
spyware accesses "electronic communications" for the purposes of the
Stored Communications Act.
Some spyware programs could conceivably operate without mining
"electronic communications" by merely searching installed program files
or other files containing documents not intended to be electronic
communications. Most spyware programs, however, focus on mining
temporarily stored electronic communications to find personally
identifiable end-user information that can be sold for advertising purposes
or exploited by the spyware company itself. Invariably, spyware programs
operating on end-user machines will gain access to some form of electronic
communications and transmit them without authorization. Due to the
difficulty of determining which files a spyware program has actually
accessed, spyware developers should have the burden of proving that the
22 1 or permanently 222
spyware operated without accessing temporarily
stored electronic communication files. Therefore, in the vast majority of
scenarios courts will likely find that spyware accesses a wire or electronic
communication as long as the alleging party can prove that the spyware
program was installed and running on its machine.
5.

Fifth Element: In Electronic Storage

The Stored Communications Act's fifth and final element is satisfied
if the spyware program accesses information stored in electronic format. To
satisfy this element, a plaintiff will only need to prove that a spyware
program accessed information stored on an end-user's machine. The Stored
Communications Act defines "electronic storage" as, "(A) any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to
the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
95223
backup
of such
communication
Allthat
spyware
programs
operate protection
on end-users'
machines
and access ....
information
is either
stored

221. Temporarily stored electronic communications include all keystrokes, pointer
movements, and mouse clicks input by an end-user.
222. Permanently stored electronic communications include all emails or instant
messaging conversations that are stored on the end-user's facility.
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (2000).
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in files on a hard drive, stored in a Web browser's cache, or temporarily
stored in the operating system's cache. As soon as an end-user inputs a
signal into a computer, that signal is transformed into a digital bit of data,
which is transmitted by the operating system to the program being utilized
by the end-user. If necessary, this information is then graphically
represented on the end-user's computer, for instance, as an image on the
monitor. Only after an input is converted into the form of a bit can a
spyware program track the end-user's activity on the computer. Therefore,
all information mined by spyware is in "temporary, intermediate
storage... incidental to the electronic transmission thereof." 224 All
information, including both saved files and end-user inputs, constitute
electronic files in "electronic storage"
for purposes of the Stored
22
Communications Act's fifth element.
6.

Spyware Does Not Fall Within a Recognized Defined Exception

Spyware developers sued under the Stored Communications Act can
defend themselves by showing that their conduct falls within a recognized
exception as defined in subsection (c) of § 2701. These exceptions include:
(1) conduct authorized "by the person or entity providing a wire or
electronic communications service; ' a 26 (2) conduct authorized "by a user
of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that
user;'227 or (3) conduct authorized in § 2703, 2704, or 2518 of title 18,228
which essentially amounts to honoring a governmental subpoena to acquire
stored electronic communications in electronic storage.
For spyware
operating on an end-user's computer to satisfy any of these exceptions, it

224. Id.
225. See Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 817 (E.D.
Mich. 2000). In Sherman the court found that the appliance manufacturer failed to state a
claim against its former sales representative who allegedly obtained the manufacturer's sales
data from the retailer's computer network and gave information to a competitor under
Section 2701 et seq. of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") prohibiting
intentional accessing of electronic data without authorization, absent allegation that the
representative's prior authorization to use retailer's computer network had been revoked or
limited. See also In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9. See Steiger, 318 F.3d
1039, cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1051 (2003) (holding computer hacker's acquisition of
information implicating defendant in sexual exploitation of children and possession of child
pornography through use of virus that enabled him to access and download information
stored on defendant's personal computer did not violate the Wiretap Act, since there was
nothing to suggest that any information was obtained by hacker through contemporaneous
acquisition of electronic communications while in flight).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2000).
227. Id.at (c)(2).
228. Id.at (c)(3).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. III 2003) (requiring disclosure of customer
communications or records to governmental entity with valid warrant); 18 U.S.C. § 2704(a).
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would have to receive end-user consent to mine data or be served with a
valid governmental subpoena requiring it to do so. Since these exceptions
fall right back into the Stored Communications Act's second prong, these
exceptions do not lend any real assistance to spyware developers except
that authorization need only be received from someone who uses an enduser's system, not the actual end-user.
7.

The Stored Communications Act's Ability to Prevent Spyware

Most spyware actions brought under the Stored Communications Act
will hinge upon (1) authorization, and (2) whether the mined data was a
stored "electronic communication." Spyware developers can avoid liability
under the Stored Communications Act by "disclosing" their program's
intentions to mine data somewhere in a EULA and having the end-user
agree to grant the program authorization to do so. 2 3 0 Currently, spyware
developers have a significant advantage over end-users because they can
bury broad, complex provisions deep within boilerplate legalese that endusers are unlikely to read. Most end-users never read EULAs anyway, and
if they do so, are unlikely to understand exactly what they will be
authorizing a spyware program to do if they accept the agreement. Contract
law, moreover, imputes a duty to read on all parties to a contract and will
only offer an end-user respite if a term in the contract is ambiguous or
unconscionable. If ambiguous, it will be interpreted against the drafter. By
acquiring legal counsel to draft unambiguous, yet deceptively vague
EULAs, spyware developers can protect themselves from liability under
the Stored Communications Act. Unconscionability will, likewise, be of
little use. No consumer can show coercion to enter a contract or uneven
bargaining position, especially if the spyware is part of freeware.
Where a spyware developer fails to include an EULA, or a crucial
term in an EULA is determined to be ambiguous, the spyware developer
could be found liable under the Stored Communications Act as long as the
program accessed stored "electronic communications." However, the
"electronic communications" requirement enables spyware operating on an
end-user's machine to mine program files and other end-user documents
that were not transmitted to another user and that were never intended to be
transmitted as electronic communications. While this gives spyware
companies the ability to mine certain end-user data absent authorization
without violating the Stored Communications Act, most spyware programs
do not limit themselves to this noncommunicated information. In fact, the
most valuable information to a spyware program is information that endusers intend to be electronic communications, such as user inputs into Web

230. See .Lan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
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browsers. While the "electronic communication" requirement will give
spyware developers a defense to certain types of data mining, most will not
be completely protected based on their current operational tendencies. As a
result, as long as an end-user can show that a spyware program mined data
on its computer without authorization, which is not an easy task in this
world of complex EULAs; the end-user will likely be able to state a cause
of action under the Stored Communications Act.
D.

Spyware Invasions of Privacyand Intrusions Upon Seclusion

A person is liable for invasion of privacy "if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person ''231 and when that person
"intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns. ... "232 Based upon
the definition in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the intrusion into a
computer by a software application intrudes upon the private affairs or
concerns of the owner of the 'computer. Even the comments of the
Restatement make it 233
clear that using electronic means is a method that fits
definition.
the
within
The standard case of violation of an individual's rights of privacy
leading to tort liability involves some sort of eavesdropping by one
individual on another individual or groups of individuals. 234 From a digital
standpoint, the closest analogies to spyware are electronic surveillance and
eavesdropping cases.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court had occasion to examine the tort
of intrusion upon seclusion in connection with a landlord who installed and
concealed a listening and recording device in the bedroom of a tenant
husband and wife. 2 3 5 The New Hampshire Supreme Court began the
analysis by determining whether a tort for intrusion upon physical and
mental solitude could lie in New Hampshire. 236 The court detailed the
history of the tort of violation of privacy. Even though this case does not
concern the use of application software to invade a user's computer, it does
concern electronic impulses-that is electronic recording of private
conversations including telephone calls-and states "intrusion upon the

231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1977).
232. Id.(emphasis added).
233. Id.at cmt. b. (mentioning "with or without mechanical aids," "tapping his telephone
wires," and "examining his private bank account.").
234. See, e.g., Hamberger,206 A.2d 239.
235. Id.at 241-42.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 241 (discussing tort violation of privacy cases in New York, Georgia, and
Rhode Island).
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plaintiff's solitude or seclusion is not limited to a physical invasion of his
home or his room or his quarters. ' 23a Based upon its analysis of cases
elsewhere, the New Hampshire Court held that a tort action would lie for
invasion of privacy
by planting microphones or taping telephone
39
conversations.
The court did not seem to be concerned with the question of whether
or not placing recording devices in a bedroom is offensive to a person of
ordinary sensibilities.
Interestingly, the defendant argued that the tort
should not be actionable in this case, because there was no evidence that
anyone actually listened to the activities in the bedroom. 24 1 The court did
not credit this argument but stated that whether or not anyone listened, the
tort would be actionable. 242 The court anticipated future technological
advances by observing that "[t]he use of parabolic microphones and sonic
wave devices designed to pick up conversations in a room without entering
it and at a considerable distance away makes the problem far from
fanciful." 24 3 A spyware perpetrator is similar to the user of the parabolic
microphone. However, this perpetrator operates from a greater distance,
does not need to wait for the subject being spied upon to speak or enter a
room, and can operate without ever entering the room him or herself.
Instead, the perpetrator can spy from a considerable distance and can still
eavesdrop upon what could be the most intimate details of the subject's life
simply by rummaging about in that subject's computer.
A New Jersey court considered the tort of invasion of privacy with
244
respect to computer records in a family law
•• case.
•
245 In that case, the
husband unwittingly saved emails from his girlfriend.
He believed that
246
his emails could only be found by using a password..
The computer was
247
left in the marital residence where any family member could access it.
Even though the court held that the wife's rummaging through the email
files was no "different than rummaging through files in an unlocked file
cabinet, ' 2 48 the case is instructive concerning the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion with respect to electronic records.

238. Hamberger,206 A.2d at 241.

239. Id.
240. Id. at 241-42.
241. Id. at242.
242. Id. (citing Carr v. Watkins, 177 A.2d 841 (Md. 1962); Bennett v. Norba, 151 A.2d
476 (Pa. 1959); Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321 (Ala. 1961)).
243. Id. (citation omitted).
244. White v. White, 781 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
245. Id. at 88.
246. Id. at 87.
247. Id. at 92.
248. Id.
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2 49
The court began with the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition
and had no difficulty finding that accessing computer records fit within one
2 50
of the comments; that is that the intrusion need not be physical.
However, the court has problems with whether the intrusion would be
highly offensive "when the actor intrudes into an area in which the victim
has either limited or no expectation of privacy."'251 Because the husband
left the computer in a room to which his wife had access, the court held that
he had no expectation of privacy as to the contents of the computer. 252 This
case is troubling from the standpoint of the consumer who is attempting to
acquire a remedy against the spyware perpetrator. The court states, "a
person's expectation of privacy to a room used for storage and to which
others have keys and access is not reasonable. Defendant's subjective belief
that the room was private is 'irrelevant.' 2 53 The user of a computer may or
may not know that being connected to the World Wide Web by telephone
line or otherwise gives another person access to certain information in the
computer. Analogizing from this case, spyware perpetrators can argue that
computer owners' beliefs that their information is private are irrelevant
because the standard knowledge in the industry is that online computers
communicate with other computers.
A more helpful case comes from the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire. 254 The United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire certified certain questions of law to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court. Essentially, the federal court wanted to know whether a
private investigator who acquired private information (such as social
security numbers), and gave that information to another (the person hiring
investigator) would be liable under the tort of intrusion upon
the private
••255
Liam Youens contacted an Internet-based investigation and
seclusion.
information service, known as Docusearch, to acquire information about
Amy Lynn Boyer. 256 Youens purchased Boyer's social security number
and employment information from Docusearch, and "on October 15, 1999,
Youens drove to Boyer's workplace and fatally shot her as she left

249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1977).

250. Id. at cmt. b.
251.

White, 781 A.2dat92.

252. Id.
253. Id. (citing State v. Brown, 660 A.2d 1221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). This is
particularly troubling in light of the Supreme Court of Washington's holding in State v.
Townsend, 57 P.3d 255 (Wash. 2002). That court held that a person using email may be
assumed to know that it is being recorded somewhere even if the person lacks actual
knowledge of digital processes. Id. at 260. Therefore, people using email are deemed to
have consented to recording of messages. Id.
254. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
255. Id.at 1004-05.
256. Id. at 1005.
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work."2 57 The court's analysis begins with a blanket statement that "[a]ll
persons have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an
unreasonable risk of harm." 2 58 The court went on to hold that "a party who
realizes or should realize that his conduct has created a condition which
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another,' 2 59
has a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent the risk from occurring."
With respect to the spyware perpetrator, this case seems to indicate
that not only the perpetrator but also the beneficiary of the spyware
insertion, namely the merchant receiving the information or receiving the
redirected Web browser, may be liable. Under the reasoning in Remsburg,
the spyware perpetrator and the merchant receiving the benefit of the
invasion of a person's computer not only realize that the conduct creates a
condition involving an unreasonable risk to a person's privacy, but actually
intend to create that unreasonable risk. The court in Remsburg identified
two risks that were reasonably anticipated, and in the case of spyware
perpetrators, should lead them to anticipate a form of stalking and identity
theft.26 The court concluded that "an investigator has a duty to exercise
reasonable care in disclosing a third person's personal information to a
client." 26 1 The investigator is to exercise reasonable care to ensure that
nothing harmful comes from the release of information. However, all
spyware does not intend harm to the individual computer owner.
The court held that whether an intrusion "would be offensive to
persons of ordinary sensibilities is ordinarily a question for the fact-finder
and only becomes a question of law if reasonable persons can draw only
one conclusion from the evidence." 262 The court refused to hold that, as a
matter of law, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a social
security number. 63 The second part of the tort of intrusion on seclusion
seems to be a question, like negligence, that normally must be determined
by a jury. Considering the volume of personal information in a computer,
courts may hold as a matter of law that the intrusion and interception of
computer-stored personal information is offensive to persons of ordinary
sensibilities; and no reasonable juror could hold otherwise. At least that is
the argument plaintiffs counsel will make in consumer civil liability. The
court cited to a Minnesota federal court opinion that lists the following
factors: the degree of intrusion, the context, the conduct, the circumstances

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 1005-06.
Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1006 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1007 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.at 1008.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
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surrounding the intrusion, the intruder's motives and objectives, and the
expectation of privacy of the person invaded. 264 Consumers will argue that
based upon the context, the degree of intrusion, and the intruder's profit
motives, courts should hold as a matter of law that invasion of a computer
by spyware is objectively unreasonable and offensive.
The problem with tort liability for either this tort or the tort of trespass
to chattels is damages. From a practical standpoint, who will bring these
claims? First, consumers' actual damages will be minimal. Spyware may
annoy consumers and even require them to spend hours trying to remove
the offending applications, but few individuals will have sufficient
damages to lead them to pursue a remedy. Moreover, with limited damages
attorneys will not institute litigation because the client will not pay an
hourly rate, and the attorney will starve on contingency arrangements
unless the firm can identify enough victims for a class action.
E.

The Wiretap Act, Spyware, Grokster, Napster,and Developers

Today, courts face a new situation where technology creators
continually side-step laws meant to prevent their actions by breaking up
software actions into multiple separate steps. 265 A prime example of the
effects of technological "evil"ution is the Wiretap Act, which has been
rendered significantly less effective by the legislature and the courts,
which have both limited its rovisions to protect only interceptions of
While this Wiretap Act construction
communications in transit.2
264. Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1009 (citing Bauer v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 149 F. Supp.
2d 1106, 1109 (D. Minn. 2001)).
265. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.
Ct. 2764, 2765 (2005) (holding that "[i]t is undisputed that StreamCast beamed onto the
computer screens of users of Napster-compatible programs ads urging the adoption of its
OpenNap program, which was designed, as its name implied, to invite the custom of patrons
of Napster, then under attack in the courts for facilitating massive infringement.").
266. Intertwined with the intent and consent elements in interpreting the Wiretap Act is
the storage-transit dichotomy. Circuits that narrowly read the Wiretap Act require the
interception to be contemporaneous with transmission. See In re Pharmatrak,Inc. Privacy
Litig., 329 F.3d at 21. Under this standard it is possible for a defendant to argue that there
are two separate communications: one between the end-user and the intended Web Portal,
and the second between the end-user and the spyware technology. See Chance v. Avenue A,
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155-57 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy
Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04; In re Pharmatrak,Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d at 12;
In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1275-76. Under this argument, a spyware
program becomes a party to the conversation authorizing its interception of the data under
the Wiretap Act. See In re Pharmatrak,Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d at 19-22. Since the
Wiretap Act allows either party to consent to the recording of data communications, the
spyware program is not violating the Wiretap Act. This is permissible because the Wiretap
Act presupposes that both parties to the conversation had knowledge that a conversation was
in fact taking place. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(d) (2000) (stating "[i]t shall not be unlawful for...
a person not acting under color of state law to intercept ... communication where such
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adequately protects point-to-point telephone calls placed over the Public
Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN"), it does not adequately protect

electronic communications sent over the Internet, such as VolP, which may
be instantaneously stored on a server before, after, or during their
transmission. 267 These temporary stops along the way enable programmers
to take advantage of the Wiretap Act by developing programs that copy or
intercept the communications while they are in the temporarily stored state
and are not in transmission. 26 8 A notable number of spyware applications
intercept data prior to269transmission, thereby avoiding potential liability
under the Wiretap Act.
Spyware programs intercepting electronic communications while in
transmission violate the Wiretap Act unless one of the parties to the
communication consents to the interception. 27 While a few spyware
programs still intercept electronic communications in transmission, most
spyware programs avoid Wiretap Act liability by mining end-user data and
electronic communications while they reside on the end-user's system prior
to actual transmission. By copying the communications in an instant prior
to transmission, most spyware programs intercept end-user electronic
communications without being 27in1 direct violation of the current judicial
construction of the Wiretap Act.

1. The Wiretap Act Falls Short in Preventing Spyware from
Operating
Whether deliberate or not, spyware companies have created a set of
products capable of bypassing the Wiretap Act to accomplish exactly what
it forbids-the interception of third-party communications without

person is party to the communication or when one of the parties has given prior consent").
Here, the end-user can assert that they lacked such knowledge and did not consent to the
communication, but unfortunately, the law has precluded the end-user from asserting that
the transmission occurred without their consent. Id.
267. See Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 101,120-22.
268. See Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 121.
269. See, e.g., U.S. v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that because
the captured keystrokes were not transmitted by a system that affects interstate commerce,
spying with the device did not violate the federal act because it did not intercept the
communication while it was being transmitted).
270. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133, 1136-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(distinguishing between a spyware program that breaks into a computer and retrieves
information already stored on the hard drive, and a spyware program that copies the
communication as it is transmitted and routes the copy to a storage file in the computer).
271. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV,274 F.3d at 581-82, n.l0 (explaining, with respect
to alleged unauthorized use of a Web site, Congress' failure to define "without
authorization" in the CFAA, and discussing some possible, practicable definitions of the
term).
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consent. 2 72 Spyware achieves this feat through a two-step process whereby
it first records end-user keystrokes, 273 pointer movements, and mouse
clicks while an end-user views data on a computer; and in a second step, it
transfers the data to an authorized server. 274 Spyware transactions are thus
analyzed under the Wiretap Act as two distinct transactions: (1) data
recording and (2) data transmission. In the recording phase, spyware tracks
an end-user's keystrokes, pointer movements, and mouse clicks on a Web
page viewed on the end-user's machine; or it records other transactions
made on the local machine, such as altering a word or document or
composing an email. In the transmission phase, spyware transmits the
information it has recorded to the spyware's server.
The act of combining these two actions enables spyware companies to
intercept end-users' communications with Web Portals, friends, businesses,
and other parties of interest. 276 In the present day, these "interceptions" fail
to trigger civil or criminal liability under the Wiretap Act because neither
step of the process contains an unauthorized third-party interception of an
electronic, oral, or wire communication. The Wiretap Act specifically
permits the intentional
interception 278of wire, oral, or electronic
277
communications
without a court order as long as one of the parties to
the communication consents to the interception. 279 By dividing the datarecording and transmission phases into two distinct acts, spyware does not
violate the Wiretap Act because during the recording phase, the spyware
"intercepts" the data before a transmission has taken place. Furthermore,
during the transmission phase, both the spyware program itself and the
spyware server "consent" to the data transmission, enabling the entire
transaction to fall within the Wiretap Act's consent exception.
a. Recording Phase
During the recording phase, spyware does not intercept a real-time
272. See supra Part II.

273. See, e.g., Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (finding that because the captured
keystrokes were not transmitted by a system that affects interstate commerce, spying with
the device did not violate the federal act).
274. Spyware is capable of transmitting much more than the Web shopping patterns of
the end-user. This technology has the ability to transmit data stored on a machine.
275. See Deborah Radcliff, Spyware, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 26, 2004, at 51.
276. "I agree with the Court that the distributor of a dual-use technology may be liable
for the infringing activities of third parties where he or she actively seeks to advance the
infringement." Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2787 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
277. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
278. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000) (limiting court-ordered surveillance to law
enforcement bugs or wiretaps and establishing strict requirements for court-authorized
interceptions of wire communications).
279. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c)-(d) (2000) (containing consent exceptions).
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third-party electronic communication sent over a wire in interstate
28
commerce because the data resides entirely on the end-user's machine. 0
However, spyware does violate the Wiretap Act if it intercepts "electronic
communications" in transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the
communication process. 28 1 Most spyware programs record data after it is
input by the end-user but before the data is actually transmitted over the
Internet. 2 82 The temporal difference between recording stored
communications as opposed to transmitting electronic communications
could be miniscule. Nonetheless, as long as the spyware records the data
while it resides on the end-user's machine before it is transmitted, the
spyware application has not violated the Wiretap Act. For example, when
an end-user requests a Web page, a Web Portal transmits the Web page to
the end-user's machine. 283 The Web page is then displayed on the enduser's own machine where the end-user can edit fields prior to the
retransmission of data to the Web Portal that occurs once the end-user
clicks a hypertext link. 2 84 A "communication" transpires for purposes of
the Wiretap Act only when the end-user transmits data to the Web
Portal. 285 As long as the spyware merely records the end-user's field inputs
prior to resubmission of the information, no "interception" of an electronic
communication sent over interstate lines has taken place, and the spyware
publisher faces no liability under the Wiretap Act.
Although spyware creators can tap dance their way around the
Wiretap Act's provisions by recording end-user data before transmission,
they can still be found liable under the Wiretap Act for recording real-time
280. See David M. Martin, Jr. et al., The Privacy Practices of Web Browser Extensions,
44 COMMC'N OFTHE ACM 45, 48 (2001).
281. See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 85 (1st Cir. 2005).
282. See Conrad Bums, CommunicationsPolicyfor the Next Four Years, 57 FED. COMM.
L.J. 167, 169 (2005); Paula J. Bruening & Michael Steffen, "Spyware": Technologies,
Issues, and PolicyProposals,7 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2004).
283. See Martin et al., supra note 280.
284. The World Wide Web enables an end-user to access a Web page, or other
"resource," on the World Wide Web, by "typing the URL of the page" into their browser, or
"by following a hypertext link to that page or resource." See Wikipedia, World Wide Web,

How the Web Works, http://wikipedia.org/wiki/WorldwideWeb#How the web works
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006). "The first step, behind the scenes, is for the server-name part of
the URL to be resolved into an IP address by the global, distributed Internet database known
as the Domain name system or DNS." Id. Second, the end-user's HTTP request is sent to the
Web server working at that IP address for the page required. Id. "The web browser's job is
then to render the page as described by the HTML, CSS and other files received,
incorporating the images, links and other resources as necessary" so that it "produces the
on-screen 'page"' that is displayed to the end-user. Id.
285. See Councilman, 418 F.3d at 85 (holding that the term "electronic communication"
includes transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the communication process, and
hence, that interception of an email message in such storage is an offense under the Wiretap
Act).
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end-user communications. Under United States v. Councilman, spyware
creators will be liable for making unauthorized interceptions of electronic
communications in transient electronic storage that is intrinsic to the
communication process. 28 6 For example, a spyware program monitoring
fields input by an end-user on a real-time Java Applet could violate the
Wiretap Act if the end-user's inputs are simultaneously being transmitted
to another end-user. 2 87 Similarly, a spyware program running with system
privileges could record inputs by an end-user onto a word document stored
on a communal server where multiple end-users are involved in editing the
document at the same time. In both of these situations, the spyware is
intercepting end-user electronic communications in violation of the
inputs are being intercepted while
Wiretap Act because the end-user's
28 8
users.
other
to
transmitted
being
Spyware providers in the previously mentioned scenarios can still
plead a consent defense arguing that the end-user offered either explicit or
implicit consent to the third-party monitoring. 289 Spyware is most
commonly loaded on an end-user's machine as a component of other "free"
programs. 29 While end-users explicitly consent to the EULA terms of the
entire software •package, they do not
291 explicitly consent to the capabilities
portions unless the capabilities of the
the
spyware
uses
of
and nefarious
spyware program are included in the EULA and the consumer reads it in its
entirety. If so, spyware providers will have a strong defense for purposes of
the Wiretap Act, since courts require consent to be actual, although it can
be implied or explicit. 292 End-users may be able to overcome the consent
defense if the EULA terms regarding the spyware are ambiguous or
nonexistent. However, as long as the spyware discloses in the EULA that it
will record information, end-users will have no cause of action under the
Wiretap Act. Unfortunately, most end-users fail to read the EULA closely
because they either cannot understand the terms of the contract, have no
desire to read the contract, or have no conception of the risk that the
contract could pose to their personal information. 2 93 Spyware distributors
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Eric Doyle, Not All Spyware is as Harmless as Cookies: Block It or Your
Business Could Pay Dearly, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Nov. 25, 2003, at 32 (examining the
various technologies that can be used to invade a user's machine and how they operate.)
288. See Farrow, supra note 3, at 53.
289. See Garrie et al., supra note 13, at 100, 118-19, 127.
290. See e.g., Scumware, supranote 17.
291. See generally Cybersecurity and Consumer Data: What's at Risk for the
Consumer?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot.
of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 61-63 (2003) (statement of Roger
Thompson, Vice President of Product Development, PestPatrol).
292. See In re Pharmatrak Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d at 19.
293. A proposed solution would be for a law requiring all software containing spyware
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exploit the general cultural apathy towards reading legalese, thereby
acquiring end-user consent for virtually limitless electronic privacy
transgressions. Nowadays, spyware is an enormous problem; in fact, some
experts estimate that up to 80 percent of the machines have some form of
spyware loaded unbeknownst to the user.2 94 Unfortunately, due to the lax
consent requirement and the restrictive interstate transmission requirement,
the Wiretap Act is unable to protect most end-users from spyware's
invasive tendencies.
b. Transmission Phase
The Wiretap Act's lax requirement of unilateral consent grants
spyware developers nearly absolute protection from liability under the
Wiretap Act when the spyware transmits data to the main server. The
Wiretap Act only prohibits
the intentional interception of wire, oral, or
29526
electronic communications without a court order if neither party to the
communication consents to the interception. 29 7 Generally, courts can find
that it is tautological that the spyware server receiving the data transmission
from the end-user's computer consents to the receipt of the transmission.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the party unknowingly "sending" the
data actually consents to the transmission since the Wiretap Act only
requires one of the two parties to consent. Because courts never reach the
question of whether the transmitting party consents to the recording, courts
need not consider whether the identity of the transmitting "person" is the
spyware software, the end-user, or the end-user's computer. This ambiguity
need not be resolved in a Wiretap Act analysis, although it could become a
serious issue under individual state wiretapping acts, some of which require
all parties to consent.
2. Conclusion: Spyware Faces Limited Liability Under the Wiretap
Act
Spyware is usually designed to copy and transmit information input

to list at the top of the EULA in bold, capital letters, all of the capabilities of the spyware
and the data that it will track. This law would also state that consumers cannot impliedly or
explicitly consent to spyware interceptions unless the provisions of this law are followed.
This would help push spyware under the Wiretap Act (although still unlikely because no
"interception of a communication" takes place) as well as empower consumers to bring
trespass to chattels claims against spyware distributors.
294. See Metz, supra note 14, at 79-80.
295. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
296. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000) (limiting court-ordered surveillance to law enforcement
bugs or wiretaps and establishing strict requirements for court-authorized interceptions of
wire communications).
297. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c)-(d) (2000) (containing consent exceptions).
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into or stored on an end-user's computer, not to intercept electronic
communications. The well-planned separation of data mining into the two
separate steps of recording and transmission protects the majority of
spyware data mining transactions from liability under the Wiretap Act. The
required transmission over a wire in interstate commerce protects the
majority of interceptions from liability in the recording phase while the lax
unilateral consent requirement protects nearly all spyware transmissions
from liability in the transmission phase. Spyware could, however, still face
some potential liability under the Wiretap Act in the recording phase for
transactions involving recording real-time end-user inputs that are
simultaneously transmitted to other end-users.
In summation, spyware that either records end-users' keystrokes,
pointer movements, and mouse clicks, 29 or transmits data stored on the
end-user machine before the end-user communications are transmitted to a
Web Portal faces no liability under the Wiretap Act. 2 99 While there is some
potential liability under specific and more stringent state wiretapping
statutes, there are many obstacles to bringing a successful claim. Whether
by accident or by careful design, spyware developers have created software
that does an end-run around the Wiretap Act. Courts making strict, literal,
and statutory interpretations have all but eliminated the Wiretap Act's
viability as a cause of action against spyware or any other electronic
communication mining tools that copy only temporarily stored information
without actually intercepting communications in transit. It remains to be
seen whether this constructionist trend will continue unabated or shift
toward a focus on statutory intent, following the Supreme Court's Grokster
decision.
IV. SOLUTION TO CLOSE LOOPHOLE THAT ENABLES SPYWARE
TO BYPASS THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Spyware victims have several legal vehicles as discussed above;
however, no single cause of action provides the "silver bullet." Spyware is
an epidemic generating innumerable privacy rights violations, causing
identity theft with actual economic loss to individuals, resulting in loss of
proprietary business information, as well as causing significant damage to
infected personal computers or corporate computer systems. Presently,
spyware victims must patch together a web of complex federal statutes and
298. Monitoring mouse clicks may lead to liability under the Wiretap Act because as
soon as the mouse is clicked on a link, a communication has been initialized, and the
spyware is then "intercepting" that communication, albeit very close to the source on the
end-user's computer. In addition, the transmission of other information that is of a private
nature might constitute a cause of action under the concept of digital theft.
299. Companies that produce spyware that does more than log keystrokes, cursor
movements, or mouse clicks would be potentially liable under the Wiretap Act.
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state common law theories instead of having a straightforward cause of
action. While all of the potential remedies described above may provide
assistance for some consumers and businesses in certain countries under
the right circumstances, most spyware has been able to bypass any criminal
or civil liability.
A. Anti-spyware Legislation: Multi-Click Consent Agreements
Analogous to InitialingEach PertinentPoint Respective to Data
Mining Performedby the Software Provider
Requiring by statute both general acceptance of EULA terms as well
as specific acceptance at all relevant points where access is granted to the
user's personal information would minimize unknowing consent by the
end-user and consequently eliminate most spyware. Such a multi-click
consent agreement itself should
use language that can be understood by the
3
00
consumer.
sophisticated
least
This multi-click consent solution has two components. First, the
consumer is required to consent through a series of "clicks." Second, the
spyware vendor must retain the multi-click consent agreement. However,
prior to the user's even addressing the details of the consent agreement, it is
imperative that the vendor provide the user with a warning that clicking on
the agreement has the same legal effect as physically signing a piece of
paper. The end-user must comprehend that clicking "accept" is identical to
"signing on the dotted line."
Only after the end-user understands the ramifications of "clicking"
may the vendor present a multi-click consent EJLA. This EULA should
provide an overview of each portion of the agreement in plain English 30 1
and require the user to click "ok" for each clause relevant to the
transmission of personal information to a third-party vendor, thereby
signifying that the end-user read and consented to that use of personal
information. 302 Essentially, each clause pertaining to data transmission of
300. This standard appears in many existing federal consumer statutes. For instance, the
Fair Debt Collection Act does not require the consumer to prove he or she was actually
misled, but uses an "unsophisticated consumer" standard to determine whether a
communication is misleading. See, e.g., Peters v. General Service Bureau, Inc. 277 F.3d
1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2002).
301. The language of the EULA must be written with the understanding that the end-user
is not a lawyer or a programmer. Therefore, any legal or technical language must be
carefully defined in simple terms.
302. The EULA should also provide the users with examples of the explicit information
that the spyware agreement enables the program to mine from their machines. While the
EULA currently may state that information is mined, under current practice it is unlikely
that even the users who have read the EULA before clicking through can understand what
data is being appropriated or the ramifications of its being mined. An example might read,
"By installing this spyware application, you are consenting to the transmission of personal
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personal data should require a check box to be clicked.
For instance, "piggyback spyware" applications such as Kazaa would
no longer be able to embed a provision in their EULA granting consent to
the installation of spyware applications that are invisible to the user.
Instead, the multi-click EULA would bring a specific consent component to
the user's attention that would only grant the spyware permission to install
and operate on the user's machine after the user is informed in plain and
unambiguous language of the personal data that the spyware may record
and, potentially, transmit. Therefore, Kazaa and other such "piggyback
spyware" that operates with a current EULA loophole would be greatly
limited. They would likely be unable to obtain the average end-user's
consent to the software installation once the ramifications are explained in
a lengthy and easy to understand EULA in plain English that the end-user
can only accept in small portions. This first component will better protect
users against "piggyback spyware" applications because multi-click
consent in plain English ensures that users are no longer unknowingly
consenting to the installation and operation of spyware applications
through
30 3
a cumbersome, incomprehensible, and generally unread EULA.
The second statutory component requires vendors to store the user's
multi-click consent on their servers for as long as they use, sell, or collect
the user's data. By compelling storage of the multi-click consent, the valid
commercial user can show consent to rebut claims by users that the
companies' spyware operated in a manner "invisible" to the user. For
instance, a company could rebut a user's claim that the company obtained
personal information without the user's consent with documentary
evidence of the user's explicit multi-tiered consent to the installation and
operation of the software. Commercial users consequently have a viable
affirmative defense, and the judiciary gains a mechanism permitting judges
to differentiate between nefarious and permissible spyware.
The multi-click consent solution enables the law to differentiate
between data mining by companies that monitor pages visitors view on
their own Web sites (a practice with clear commercial advantages that does
not violate- the end-user's personal privacy) from data mining done by
spyware programs actually installed on the end-user's personal computer to
monitor keystrokes, passwords, and other personal information without the
user's consent. 30 4 Documenting this distinction will facilitate civil and
criminal prosecution of unlawful spyware because such unlawful vendors
information. This information includes the following.

Examples of such data are as

follows. 1. Mary J. Jenkins; 07/05/1969 DOB, etc."

303. See .Lan Sys., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
304. It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide the technical details of how such
technology would operate, but further information is available from Daniel Garrie.
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would lack the users' consent, whereas lawful vendors would have the
users' consent. 305 Thus, the multi-tiered consent solution directly addresses
unlawful spyware while directly addressing the highly problematic
"piggyback spyware" issue. Most importantly, even the average user will
be protected from the misleading and cumbersome consent agreements
through which "piggyback spyware" currently operates.
Ideally, anti-spyware legislation gives the best overall solution to
users in the United States. This solution could be achieved by amending the
Stored Communications Act to heighten the requirements for
"authorization" and "consent." Increasing the disclosure and consent
requirements for obtaining "authorization" and "consent" enables both
general and specific programs to operate and ensures the end-users know to
what datasets they are granting the programs access. 306 Consequently, this
solution allows the market's invisible hand to re-allocate resources in a
manner consistent with society's desires, and it does not eliminate
legitimate data mining and harvesting businesses because users control the
data on their machines. Moreover, it grants these vendors legitimate and
effective affirmative defenses which hinge on the fact that they can
demonstrate both "authorization"
and "consent" occurred between their
30 7
product and the end-use.
Finally, a multi-click EULA incorporation into the anti-spyware
legislation will ensure that any litigation pertaining to spyware has specific
elements and components that the defendant failed to meet. Such
legislation could mirror current federal consumer legislation such as the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") 308 that authorizes statutory
remedies and attorney's fees for the prevailing consumer, envisions class
actions, and sets a "least sophisticated consumer" standard. In 1977
Congress amended the Consumer Credit Protection Act to create the
FDCPA.30 9 It specifically found that "[e]xisting laws and procedures ' for
3 10
redressing the[ ] injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.
Similarly, Congress should find that existing laws, both statutory and based
305. The EULA should also detail the fact that the spyware will be transmitting data over
the Internet, perhaps incurring Internet data transmission fees to the end-user as well as
subjecting it to further interception by others.
306. One possibility is to require these programs to disclose the specific data they are
accessing and/or mining in bold letters at the top of the EULA.
307. The adoption of this solution could also create a market for different types of
spyware that mine different types of data. In this way, consumers could select freeware and
shareware programs based on the capabilities of the bundled spyware and the consumers'
valuation of the data that would be mined.
308. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000).
309. See Pub. L. 95-109, §§ 802 et seq., 91 Stat. 874 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et
seq.) (1977).
310. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) (2000).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 59

on common law torts, are inadequate to address similar abusive and
deceptive 3 1 1 practices of spyware on behalf of consumers. Just as with debt
collection, spyware "practices are carried on to a substantial extent in
interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities of such
commerce," 3 12 justifying congressional action.
Because few debt collection practices gave rise to sufficient damage
to encourage private enforcement, but were collectively significant 3in
13
leading to, among other things, "invasions of individual privacy,"
Congress fashioned an appropriate remedy in the spyware context for the
same reasons. First, Congress authorized private rights of action 3 14 for
individual actions of actual damages and created statutory damages of no
the FDCPA authorized attorneys' fees
more than $1,000. 3 15 Furthermore, 316
plaintiff.
prevailing
the
to
and costs
Perhaps most importantly, Congress gave explicit authorization of
class actions with actual damages for each individual, as well as statutory
damages not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the
defendant's net worth. 3 17 The attorneys' fees provision 3 18 also applies to
class actions. To protect the debt collector operating in good faith who
makes a simple error, Congress inserted the opportunity for that defendant
to show "by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding ' the
3 19
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
Finally Congress created concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal
courts. 32 While abusive practices of debt collectors still occur, by and
large the statute has successfully curtailed such practices while ensuring
that those who collect debts using non-abusive means "are not
competitively disadvantaged .... ,,321
If lawmakers did pass such anti-spyware legislation including a multiclick EULA component, programs that auto-update on behalf of the enduser and any other action the end-user approves would automatically be
exempted because the end-user would already have given informed
consent. Consequently, such legitimate businesses would find protection in
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Seeid. § 1692(a).
Id. § 1692(d).
Id. § 1692(a).
Id. § 1692k(a).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)(1), (a)(2)(A).
Id. § 1692k(a)(3).
Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 1692k(a)(3).
Id. § 1692k(c).
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
Id. § 1692(e).
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the legislation. The proposed legislation, however, should ensure that
anything that is added or installed without the end-user's consent as
reflected in the multi-click EULA requirements or installed on a computer
on behalf of someone other than the actual owner of the machine is a
violation of the anti-spyware legislation.
1. Global Spyware and the Data Mining Industry
While amending the United States' law would notably improve the
situation with respect to spyware, it would not end the spyware epidemic.
Spyware is a borderless pandemic-spyware vendors could still operate
effectively outside the reach of the United States jurisdiction. Therefore, in
order to effectively implement a multi-click consent EULA, a uniform law
should be developed standardizing the enforcement of spyware control
worldwide. Until the vast majority of governments address spyware
through multi-click consent, spyware vendors will continue to capitalize on
different countries' laws.
While the data mining and spyware industries may be likely to resist
any such multi-click consent requirement, spyware is analogous to
cigarettes in that consumers should, at the very least, be informed of the
potential harm that they may incur. Even though cigarette manufacturers
resisted warnings, many countries require them for the physical health of
their citizens. Similarly, countries should require multi-click consent
requirements for the "privacy health" of their citizens. Like cigarette
smokers, end-users would still be able to allow spyware to operate on their
systems if they chose to do so. The significant difference would be that the
end-users would be able to make an informed choice-just as those who
smoke presumably know of the harms that prolonged exposure to noxious
cigarette fumes can cause to their bodies. Utilizing this multi-click consent
approach and incorporating explicit and understandable consent language
would greatly
alleviate unwanted privacy intrusions by data mining
322
programs.
A civil enforcement giving significant civil damages to
aggrieved individuals irrespective of their actual losses can help ensure that
perpetrators
who mine personal data without informed consent are brought
323
to justice.
2. Potential Non-Statutory Solutions
While the international community is increasingly regulating
activities on the Internet with promising positive law,324 another viable tool
322. See Blakley et al., supra note 36, at para. 32.
323. See Daniel B. Garrie, Warning: Software May be Hazardous to Your Privacy!, 2
J.L. & POL'Y FOR THE INFO. SOC'Y (2006).

324. See generally Mary Rundle, Beyond lnternet Governance: The Emerging
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for preventing spyware privacy infringements is to give courts greater,
prompt access to information about emerging technologies and their
potential to violate individuals' rights. It is imperative that courts around
the world be informed so they can be empowered to apply existing privacy
laws in their respective countries to new cases involving data processing
disputes. This is especially true because many countries have adopted
legislation, such as the European Directive of 1995325 that could be applied
to spyware. Unfortunately, the technological underpinnings are
increasingly complicated, and judges need to have access to all available
information to fully understand the technologies and how they are being
used, or could be used, to violate the law. For instance, the Reference
Scientific Manual 326 is used by United States federal judges to cover
various complex technological and scientific issues with which they may
be unfamiliar. To date, it does not have any pertinent information on
spyware or other complex Web-enabled software. This void in
technological reference material and education should be corrected by
providing an educational curriculum accessible to judges.
Such a curriculum might include a combination of online, in-person,
and paper materials; and it could utilize a variety of educational tools so as
to maximize accessibility to all judges across national borders. By
standardizing not only data mining law, but also the technical education
and methods of applying such laws to specific cases, those who use
spyware technologies for unethical ends will be at a tremendous
disadvantage. Judicial education would help to establish a complete and
potentially consistent body of case law in the international community
because judges would have full understanding of how much privacy
infringement data mining technologies are capable of having. Ideally, an
internationally standardized technology curriculum for judges could be an
extremely useful aid to justices presiding over privacy disputes involving
new technologies.
B. Legislative Intent Is Accepted by Courts
Instead of waiting for the legislature to act, the courts could act now
to slow the spyware dilemma. Today courts are faced with a new situation

International Framework for Governing the Networked World (The Berkman Center for

Internet & Soc'y at Harvard Law School, Research Publication No. 2005-16, Fall 2005)
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/uploads/514/2005_RundleBeyondInternet
Governance.pdf. (detailing ways in which countries can regulate the Internet).
325. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Directive
95/46/EC].
326. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1994)
[hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL].
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where creators of software 32 7 continually side step laws meant to prevent
their actions. 3 28 A prime example of where a firm grasp of software played
a notable role is in Grokster,329 where the Supreme Court held that a
software distributor of multiple use technology might be liable for the
infringing on activities of third parties where the parties actively seek to
advance the infringement. 33 The Court further held that the lower courts
must be mindful of technology developers who, with devious intent,
successfully code around the law. 33 1 Grokster compels lower courts to
examine whether the design of a software application is sought to side step
the law. 332 Although Grokster is applicable only in the copyright realm, the
Supreme Court's focus on the inner-workings of filesharing technology
demonstrates the growing need for judges to hear such matters to possess a
framework for understanding software and to examine the intent of the
legislature that passed the original statute. Perhaps the Supreme Court
points the way for lower courts to find new ways to address the spyware
problem. In Grokster, the Court is arguably reversing a long-standing legal
trend by moving away from a literal application of common law authority
and statutes, especially those dealing with technological matters, when the
"full transaction" clearly violates a legal principle or the drafters' intent.

327. Computer "software" is generally defined as that material, separable from the
"hardware," or physical equipment which comprises the computer programs and
instructions. See generally William A. Fenwick & Gordon K. Davidson, Admissibility of
Computerized Business Records, 14 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 173. Software has also
been more widely defined as all those aspects of the computer which are not hardware, and
thus includes such known programming elements as educational material, manuals, training
of personnel, and perhaps even maintenance of the hardware. See John G. Martin, Note, The
Revolt Against the Property Tax on Software: An Unnecessary Conflict Growing out of
Unbundling, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 118 (1975). For the purposes of this annotation, the
category of computer software includes (among other items) computer programs, the media
on which they were recorded, and the services which may be rendered to the computer
purchaser by the manufacturer after purchase of the machine; only the computer machinery
itself is considered hardware.
328. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 (holding that "[i]t is undisputed that StreamCast
beamed onto the computer screens of users of Napster-compatible programs ads urging the
adoption of its OpenNap program, which was designed, as its name implied, to invite the
custom of patrons of Napster, then under attack in the courts for facilitating massive
infringement.")
329. In Grokster, the Supreme Court found that although the black letter of the law had
been followed in the context of determining liability, the intent behind the specific actions
directed the outcome against Grokster. 125 S. Ct. at 2767.
330. Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
33 1. See generally id. at 2791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring); Cable/Home Communication
Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 842, 847 (11th Cir. 1990); Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262 (5th Cir. 1988); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F. 3d 655,
661 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A person may be liable as a contributory infringer if the product or
service it sells has no (or only slight) legal use .....
332. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764.
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While the Grokster decision narrowly applies only to copyright
violations, the Supreme Court's method of focusing on the distributor's
intent and the product's advertised use may influence lower courts to
broadly construe other common law holdings and statutes dealing with
technology to prevent programmers from taking advantage of rigid legal
constructs. In the context of spyware programs, a compelling argument can
be raised that while spyware does not violate the letter of the Wiretap Act
when viewed on microscopic or micro-temporal levels, it violates the spirit
of the law and should be considered to violate the Act when spyware
are constructed deliberately to intercept electronic
programs
communications, even if those communications are stored instantaneously
on a server. By doing so, the courts would both deter devious technological
development occurring at the edge of legality and would prevent the
common law and statutes from having their power and effectiveness
constantly whittled away by individuals looking for legal avenues to
perform lucrative business acts that require them to "break the law."
When dealing with nefarious technological innovation, courts should
not require the legislature to be exceptionally vigilant because doing so
would force the legislature to constantly redraft and repass legislation every
few years as technologists find ways around existing laws. Instead, courts
should begin interpreting technological statutes broadly to enforce the
statutory intent when technologists continuously attempt to contravene the
statutes' purposes through technological "evil"ution. While the Supreme
Court's Grokster decision is a significant step in the right direction, it is
unlikely that lower courts will move noticeably away from the literal
interpretation framework they have used in the past. Therefore, the most
pragmatic solution is for state legislatures or Congress to draft provisions
that prevent technologists from creating products designed to avoid
statutory liability but that violate the spirit of the law.
V. CONCLUSION
The existing tort theories of liability and statutes do not provide
consumers an adequate remedy for spyware perpetrators. Perhaps some of
the theories may help large corporations that have extensive damage.
Perhaps some attorneys may bring claims as class actions. However,
generally, the availability of defenses such as authorization based on
implied consent in a lengthy, legalistic EULA, eviscerates such relief.
Furthermore, the limited damages available to the consumer reduce the
likelihood of finding meaningful representation.
Courts' interpretations of the statutes are inconsistent, and courts'
applications of tort liability depend upon each of the states' tort laws. Even
within a state, the federal court and the state court may interpret tort law
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differently. 333 Moreover, even if courts allow tort liability, damages are
unlikely to be sufficient to deter spyware perpetrators.
Congress should act to remedy the situation and to create uniform
national law. Congress could address the significant spyware problem by
carefully crafting requirements for those engaged in data mining from
consumers. First, spyware perpetrators must have the responsibility to show
that the consumer explicitly and knowingly authorized the data mining.
Spyware can be defined in such a way that legitimate cookie technology
can continue to serve legitimate business needs and consumer desires. After
defining spyware activities, Congress can state that no one engaged in
those activities may claim that a consumer implicitly authorizes data
mining. Congress can create a presumption that the existence of language
within an EULA alone is not sufficient to authorize such activity. As in
another consumer protection law, the Truth in Lending Act, Congress can
require any explicit agreement to be clear and conspicuous. 334 Congress
can require the disclosure to include explicit and simple language
concerning the effects of agreeing. And, in addition, it can mandate that the
spyware user bears the burden of proving that the agreement is clear and
conspicuous and that the end-user explicitly agreed. Such requirements
cannot possibly hurt the legitimate business if
coupled with a provision
33 5
such as the FDCPA's bona fide error provision.
Finally, statutory penalties significant enough to deter bad actors and
to encourage private attorneys to bring enforcement actions, coupled with
Congressional approval of class action relief, can help eliminate spyware
used for bad purposes. Consumers need protection, but the protection
should not hamper legitimate business. Rather than hoping that courts will
fashion remedies to protect both legitimate business and consumers,
Congress needs to act. Spyware is not only annoying, it is dangerous to
businesses and to consumers; private attorneys and the courts do not have
the resources to address the problem.

333. Compare eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (finding trespass to chattels with no "real"
damage) with Intel Corp., 71 P.3d at 300 (eviscerating the tort in terms of spyware).
334. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000).
335. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2000).
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